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Institutional Arrangements for Conjunctive Water Management
in California and Analysis of Legal Reform Alternatives
Ella Foley-Gannon*
I.

Introduction

The history of California in the twentieth century is the story of
a state inventing itself with water.'
The creation of California's water resources system has not been an easy
task given the state's hydrology and demographics. California's water problem is
not so much a lack of precipitation as it is an uneven, and highly variable,
distribution of its water resources. More than seventy percent of California's
water supply originates north of San Francisco, principally in the Sacramento
River basin and in the North Coast. Yet, approximately seventy-five percent of
the demand for water is to the south of this hydrological divide. On average,
seventy-five percent of California's annual precipitation falls between November
and March, with fifty percent occurring between November and February.
California's hydrological cycle is not synchronized, however, with the seasonal
demand for water. Urban and agricultural water use is relatively low during the
period of abundant supply and peaks in the summer and late fall months when
precipitation is usually nonexistent.
Moreover, to compound these disparities, water supplies vary dramatically
from year-to-year. Annual water run-off in the state is approximately 71 million
acre-feet. But this average includes a record low of 15 million acre-feet in 1977,
which was the second year of the worst acute drought on record, and the
historic high of 135 million acre-feet in 1983, an El Nifio year. During the
twentieth century, California has suffered serious droughts in 1912-13, 1918-20,
1922-24, 1929-34, 1947-50, 1959-61, 1976-77, and 1987-92.2

* I.D., 1998, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Ms. Foley-Gannon is
an associate at Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton in San Francisco, practicing
environmental and land use law.
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2. All data are taken from CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURcES, BULL. 160-98, CALIFORNIA
WATER PLAN UPDATE, Vol. 1,at 3-2 to 3-11 (1998) [hereinafter CAUFORNIAWATER PLAN UPDATE].
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These variations render water resources management highly uncertain. To
address these variations and uncertainties, California water managers have had
to create systems to store water during times of abundance and to transport the
water from areas of surplus to areas of need. California's monumental and
complex array of reservoirs and conveyance facilities stands as testament to the
ingenuity and resourcefulness of these leaders.
As the demand for water continues to increase, further innovations in water
resources management will be imperative. The California Department of Water
Resources ("DWR") projects that California's population willgrow to 47.5 million by
the year 2020, up from 32.1 million in 1995. Accompanying this growth will be an
increase in the demand for water by municipal and industrial users from
approximately 8.8 million acre-feet in 1995 to 12 million acre-feet in the year 2020.'
Based on the capacity of existing water supply facilities and water management
programs, DWR predicts that there will be an annual water shortage of 2.4 million
acre-feet in normal years and 6.2 million acre-feet during periods of drought.4
The extent of California's vulnerability both to cycles of shortage and to
long-term distributional disparities is highlighted by the most recent drought in
California, which lasted from 1987 to 1992. During this period, farmers and
municipalities suffered from severe water shortages and were forced to ration
water and fallow land.5 The drought also contributed to a panoply of
environmental problems, including damage to vulnerable fish populations,
significant loss of timber in the Sierra Nevada, and increased fire hazards.6
Moreover, many water users relied heavily on groundwater to compensate for
deficits in surface water supplies.7 This increase in groundwater pumping caused
the overdraft of many of California's groundwater basins.8 Prolonged overdraft

3. See id. at 4-2. According to DWR's projections, agricultural water use will decline
slightly from 33.8 million acre-feet in 1995 to 31.5 million acre-feet in 2020. See id.
4.

See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE Volume. 2, supra note 2, at 6-2.

5. The economic effects of farmers fallowing land are not limited to the farmers themselves.
When water shortages force local farming operations to go out of operation, agricultural suppliers
and farm workers can experience unemployment, local businesses may lose revenue and rural
communities can suffer decreased public resources. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional
Persp tive on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL L REV. 673, 733-35 (1993); Charles V.Moore, Discussion,in
WATER ScARcnTY: IMPACTs ON WEsrERN AGRICULTURE 266, 268-69 (Emest A Engelbert & Ann Foley

Scheuring eds., 1984); Deborah Moore &Zach Willey, Waterin the American West: Institutional Evolution and
EnvironmentalRestorationinthe 2 1st Century, 62 U.COLO. L.REV. 775, 793-94 (1991).
6. See Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community Lessons from California's Drought Water
Bank, I HASTINGSWEsr-NoRsHwEsT J.OF ENvrL. L.& POLY 17, 18-20 (1994).
7. For example, in 1990 there were 24,000 new wells drilled in California, the highest
number of wells drilled in a single year. See id. at 19.
8. For example, groundwater depletion in the eastern San Joaquin Valley and the
Tulare Basin exceeded eleven million acre-feet during the most recent drought. See Gray,

West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008

can cause a number of long-term, detrimental economic and environmental
effects.9 When a groundwater basin is in overdraft, groundwater users often must
deepen wells and install more powerful pumps to extract a sufficient supply of
water from ever greater depths." Overdraft also can result in subsidence of
overlying land," loss of surface vegetation and wetlands habitat, 2 depletion of
water flow in hydrologically-connected surface water systems, and degradation of
groundwater quality.'3 Moreover, extended periods of overdraft can cause the
water-bearing rock or soil in a basin to compact permanently and, thereby, reduce
the amount of storage space available in the basin for use in the future. 4 Unless
new ways are discovered to satisfy the state's burgeoning water demand,
California can expect to encounter similar problems during future droughts.
In the past, when demand for water outpaced supply, California
responded by developing new surface water resources. Today, however, political,
fiscal and environmental considerations render the construction of additional
surface water facilities less likely." Therefore, to meet the challenge of ensuring
that California's limited water supply can be stretched to meet the demands of
the twenty-first century, the state needs to develop management procedures to
provide for optimal utilization of its developed water resources.
One of the least expensive and environmentally safest ways of stretching
available water supplies is through the development of conjunctive use

supra note 6, at 19 (citing CAL.
(1992))..

DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, THE

1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK 16

9. See Gregory S. Weber, Twenty Years of Local Groundwater Export Legislation in California:
657, 660 (1994).
Lessons from a Patchwork Quilt, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J.
10.

See id.

11. 'When water is withdrawn from a groundwater basin, the underground pressure is
sometimes reduced enough to cause compaction of the water-bearing strategy. When that
happens, the overlying land subsides, losing elevation. Land subsidence can submerge once-dry
land, adversely affect drainage pattems by changing the slope of the land, and damage surface
structures such as highways, buildings, pipelines, and water distribution systems." Susan Batty
Peterson, The Designation and Protetion ofCritical Groundwater Areas, 1991, BYU L. REv. 1393, 1395
(1991).
12. The loss of wetlands can have a devastating effect on wildlife populations.
Wetlands provide critical habitat for approximately one-third of the nation's endangered
and threatened species. Since 1850, ninety-six percent of California's Central Valley
wetlands has been lost. See e.g., Moore &Willey, supra note 5, at 776-78.
13. See Zachary Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and
Prerequisites to Reform, 20 CAL. W. L.REV. 223, 225 (1984).; Allison Mylander Gregory, Groundwater
229, 232-33 (1992).
and Its Future: Competing Interests and Burgeoning Markets, II STAN. ENVrL.L.J.
14.

See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1395.

15.

249,278 (1994).
See Brian E. Gray, The Modem Era inCalbiaWater Law, 45 HAsnNs L 1.
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programs.6 Under such programs, surplus surface water is banked in
underground aquifers during wet periods and is extracted for use in times of
scarcity. Groundwater basins are used both to augment the storage capacity of
surface reservoirs and to allow for the capture of a larger percentage of annual
runoff for beneficial use. 7 In 1992, the California legislature recognized that
conjunctive use programs could play a vital role in California's efforts to use
water more efficiently by adding section 1011.5 to the California Water Code.
This law declares that "it is the policy of this state to encourage conjunctive use
of surface water and groundwater supplies and to make surface water available
for other beneficial uses.'8
Under a conjunctive use program, surface water and groundwater supplies
commingle, and the legally distinct water rights of various users are melded together.
Many different private parties and public agencies may claim a right to use, or to
regulate the use of, the water found within the groundwater basin. Conjunctive use
arrangements have worked well in adjudicated groundwater basins in Southern
California because the various rights to surface and groundwater are quantified and
the management agencies have the legal authority to enforce the pricing and other
rules that govern groundwater and surface water use. 9 Most groundwater basins in
California are unadjudicated, however, and the feasibility of conjunctive management
in these areas is consequently far less certain. This is particularly true in basins in
which a portion of the surface water is imported, stored as groundwater, and then later
withdrawn for uses outside the groundwater basin. In these situations, there exist an
array of legal and institutional uncertainties that render conjunctive management
difficult, if not impossible. These uncertainties include questions about the ownership
of the imported water, liability for displacement of in-basin recharge capacity,
regulation of groundwater users who are not parties to the conjunctive management

16. Despite the advantages of conjunctive water management, there remain a variety
of legal uncertainties and institutional impediments to the creation of large-scale
conjunctive use programs, particularly in unadjudicated basins. California has a dual system
of water rights. There is one set of rules to apportion surface water and separate rules for
groundwater. See Generally ARTHUR LITrLEWORTH & ERIC GARNER, CAUFORNIA WATER 27-70 (1995).

While the legislature has extensively regulated surface water diversions, it has exerted only
minimal control over groundwater extractions. The State Water resources Control Board
("SWRCB") regulates the appropriation and use of much of the state's surface water. In
contrast, groundwater basins are managed, if at all, by local institutions.
17. See, e.g., Linton A. Brown, Conjunctive Use: Problems and Advantages, in BIENNIAL
CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER 25 (1994); James A. Anderson, Some Thoughts on Conjunctive Use
of Groundwaterin California, 16 W. ST. L. REv. 559 (1989) (on file with author).
18.

CAL. WATERCODE§ 1011.5 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

19. These conjunctive management programs have been studied and welldocumented in WILLIAM A. BLOMoUIST, DMDING THE WATERS: GovERNING GROUNDWATER IN
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA (1992).
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agreement, the authority of local water agencies over the importation and exportation
of surface water, and liability for changes in water quality.
This article analyzes the legal and institutional opportunities and
constraints on conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water in
California. Part II presents a theoretical model for a statewide conjunctive use
program. Part III analyzes the current legal and institutional framework for
regulating the State's groundwater resources. The legal uncertainties created by
the present legal system are described in Part IV. Part V explains how a
conjunctive management scheme can be created under the current legal and
institutional regime. Part VI concludes with an evaluation of various legal
reforms that could be implemented to encourage and facilitate conjunctive
water management in California.
!1.

A Model Conjunctive Use Program
A.

Conceptual Framework

Conjunctive use programs are designed to coordinate the management of
surface water supplies and storage with the management of groundwater. The
concept of conjunctive management is not new. Individual water users with access
to both types of supplies have long coordinated their own use. They have relied on
surface water when there is ample supply and increased their use of groundwater in
times of scarcity.2 ° Many water agencies also have engaged in small scale, intraregional transfers of groundwater both to help meet their members' and customers'
needs in times of shortage and to protect groundwater quality.2 Moreover, a
number of agencies and water users with access to groundwater participated in the
1991 California Drought Water Bank. Approximately 260,000 acre-feet of surface
water was purchased from Northern California water users and sold to users
throughout the state. The sellers then substituted groundwater for the surface water
that they transferred. These transfers effectively increased the total quantity of water
available to all users by increasing the use of groundwater in the areas with access

20.
21.

See Thompson, supra note 5, at 685 n.36.
Most of these arrangements have been limited to the storage of water in basins for

the use of overlying landowners. See CAUFORNiAWATER PLAN UPDATE VOLUME. 1,supra note 2, at 3-51

to 3-53 (discussing examples of conjunctive use activity inCalifornia). For a review of the legal
authority for public agencies inCalifornia to store imported water ingroundwater basins and later
extract the water so stored, see City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975)
(public agencies have the right to the return flow from water imported into a groundwater basin);
City of Los Angeles v.City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68 (1943) (upholding the right of Los Angeles to
use the San Fernando Valley for imported groundwater banking); Niles Sand & Gravel, Co. v.
Alameda County Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1975) (Alameda
County Water District has authority to store water in a groundwater basin pursuant to its police
powers, and prevention of salt water intrusion is a beneficial use).
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to both types of supplies, while moving surface water to areas in which additional
groundwater was not available.22
Although conjunctive management is not new, the potential of California's
groundwater basins to serve as subterranean reservoirs has not been
approached. There are 450 identified groundwater basins in California that
contain about 850 million acre-feet of water.23 On average, approximately 12.5
million acre-feet of groundwater is pumped each year, with extractions rising to
15.8 million acre-feet during periods of drought.2 ' Hydrologists estimate that, in
light of current levels of extraction and recharge, 143 million acre-feet of storage
capacity within these groundwater basins is close enough to the surface, and
has sufficient permeability, to be used as temporary storage space. 2, This
potential storage capacity vastly exceeds the total capacity of California's
surface reservoirs, which are capable of storing approximately 42 million acrefeet of water.2" If this space were fully utilized, California could significantly
increase the yield of its available water resources.
Conjunctive use programs involve the movement of water captured in
surface water facilities through conveyance facilities to areas overlying
groundwater basins with accessible available storage. The water then is placed
in the basin by one of two methods; direct recharge or "in lieu" storage. With
direct recharge, water is directly recharged into a basin through the use of either
spreading fields27 or injection wells. 2 The "in lieu" method is accomplished by
delivering surface water to groundwater users who agree to forgo pumping

22.

DWR classified all of the groundwater that was pumped as a substitute for the

transferred surface water as "new" water. This classification was based on a finding that
groundwater was not taken from a hydrologically connected surface water system and was,
therefore, new water in the sense that the water would not have been available for
appropriation as part of the surface water system. See Gray, supra note 6, at 22.
23.

See LrITLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 2.

24.

See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 3-48.

25.

See Ronald B. Robie & Patricia Really. Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A

Groundwater Storage Program for the California State Water Project, II PAc. L. 1. 41, 43 (1979). An
aquifer has vacant space if there are openings between soil particles or soil strata which
could hold additional water. See Gregory, supra note 13, at 258 n. 116.
26.

See CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL i, supra note 2, at 3-23 to 3-45, see aLso
Russell

Kletzing, Imported Groundwater Banking: The Kern Water Bank: A Case Study, 19 PAc. L. I. 1225 (1988).
27. When a groundwater basin is recharged by the maintenance of a spreading field,
water is spread over porous surface areas. 'The water's weight and density force it to percolate
through the underlying soil and into the underground basin." Victor E. Gleason, Water Projects Go
Underground, 5 EcoLOGy L.Q. 625,627 (1976). The use of spreading fields is generally the preferred
means for directly recharging water into an aquifer because it is the least costly method.
28.

Under this method, water is injected into the ground by the use of force other

than gravity. See id.
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during the delivery period.29 Through either method, the importer of the water
retains title to the water it places (or allows to remain) in the groundwater basin
and has the right to extract the water when surface supplies are scarce.
Under such programs, the state's groundwater basins serve the same
function as surface reservoirs. The vacant storage capacities of groundwater basins
allow for the capture and exploitation of water that is not currently applied to
beneficial use. Conjunctive use programs, therefore, result in a net gain to
California's water supply without the development of additional surface water
storage facilities. This new water may be used to satisfy currently unmet needs
wherever they occur throughout the state, and helps to ensure a stable water
supply for the future. Additionally, such programs increase the flood control
capacity of the state's reservoirs. By placing water that is currently stored in
surface reservoirs in groundwater basins, space may be left in surface reservoirs to
absorb a sudden influx of water without the need to release water from dams.
There are a variety of other advantages to storing water in groundwater basins
rather than in surface reservoirs. First, underground storage decreases the demand
for construction of expensive surface storage facilities." Second, groundwater basins
serve as natural distribution systems and thereby obviate some of the need to
construct additional conveyance facilities.3 Third, water stored underground is not
lost to evaporation.32 Fourth, "groundwater basins provide natural treatment and
purification"33 and, therefore, can both improve water quality and reduce the costs of
treatment. Fifth, groundwater serves as an emergency supply in the event of
disruptions to surface water systems.3 4 Sixth, while water is stored within the basin,

29. See Robie &Donovan, supra note 25, at 45.
30. - For a comparison of the water development costs of surface water and groundwater
facilities, see CAL. DEP'T OFWATER RESOURcES, BULL. 76, DELTAWATER FACILmES (1998).
31. Because water moves freely throughout a groundwater basin, a user can withdraw
water from any point overlying the basin. As is discussed below, groundwater basins can consist
of hundreds of miles of hydrologically connected aquifers. Thus water can, be extracted from a
location that is geographically distant from, but hydrologically connected to, the place of active
recharge. See Gleason, supm note 27, at 626-27; Peterson, supra note 11, at 1396-97; Christopher B.
Amandes, Controlling Land Surface Subsidence: A ProposalforaMarket Based Reyulatory Scheme, 31 UCLA L.
Rsv. 1208, 1246 (1984). The cost of transporting water between hydrologically separate waterways
can be quite significant. For example, it is estimated that it will cost $50 million to move water
eighty to ninety miles from the Colorado River to the Central Arizona Project. See Thompson, supra
note 5,at 709 n. 143.
32.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 45.

33. D. JAQUETr & N. MOORE,
MANAGEMENT 3-4 (1978).

EFFICIENT WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA: GROUNDWATER USE AND

34. "Where imported water has been brought in by aqueduct, the stored water in the
underground reservoir provides a reserve against failure of the aqueduct." Kletzing, supra
note 26, at 1245.
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the groundwater level within the basin will be raised and the energy cost of
extracting water from the basin will be reduced. Finally, "storage of surface water in
natural underground basins avoids nearly all the surface land use dislocations and
stream effects that would otherwise result, since the building of surface reservoirs
often requires extensive land excavation as well as the rerouting of local streams.""
B.

Prerequisites for the Creation of Conjunctive Use Programs

For groundwater basins to be employed as subterranean reservoirs, there
must be an established method for regulating activities that affect the basin to
ensure that the water stored in the aquifer will be protected from degradation or
loss so it later can be extracted for beneficial uses. A vital first step in the
development of an effective groundwater management strategy is thorough
understanding of the hydrological and geologic conditions of the basin. Because a
conjunctive use program involves the commingling of native groundwater and
imported water, there also must be a system for establishing and protecting the
rights of those who depend on both types of sources. In addition, conjunctive
management usually involves the recharge and discharge of large quantities of
water within a basin, which may result in dramatic changes in the water table over
relatively short periods of time. Fluctuations of water levels in a groundwater
basin can affect the land overlying the basin, the purity of the water contained
within the basin, the ability of users to withdraw water from established wells and
the structure of the basin itself. These potentially deleterious third-party effects
must be identified and assessed before the benefits of such a program can be
evaluated. Finally, conjunctive management requires water users to enter into
voluntary agreements to establish the methods, procedures and responsibilities
for the delivery, storage and recapture of water within a particular basin.
Conjunctive use programs will only come to fruition if the parties with rights to
surface water and those who control the management of groundwater basins and
conveyance facilities view participation in such programs as mutually
advantageous. Thus, there must exist incentives for parties to broker such
agreements before a conjunctive use program can become operational.
I.

Groundwater Hydrology

In theory, a groundwater basin can serve the same function as a surface
reservoir: it can act as a natural receptacle for storing water for subsequent extraction
and application to beneficial use. The physical realities of a groundwater basin differ,
however, from a surface reservoir, and these differences render many of the
management techniques developed for the control of surface reservoirs inapplicable

35.

Robie &Donovan, supra note 25, at 44-45.
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to groundwater basins.3" "In many ways, groundwater is more difficult to manage than
air or surface water because it is not directly accessible and exists under a wide variety
of hydrological conditions.'37 Because the physical characteristics of groundwater
basins vary greatly, the suitability of a particular basin to serve as an area for
immediate storage and later extraction depends on its hydrological and geological
features, as well as on the quality of the water stored within the basin.
The California Water Code defines groundwater as "all water beneath the
surface of the earth within the zone below the water table in which the soil is
completely saturated with water, but does not include water which flows in
known and definite channels."38 Water within the zone of saturation accumulates
in the interstices of underground rocks and sediments and moves with relative
ease through the permeable strata in which it is contained to supply wells and
springs.39 The subsurface geological formations in which the water occurs are
called aquifers.40 As one author stated, "(al typical aquifer ... In some ways is
similar to a bucket of sand half filled with water. Drilling a well is like digging a
hole in this sand and allowing it to fill with water which can then be removed."'"
A groundwater basin consists of "a geologically and hydrologically defined area

which contains one or more aquifers which store and transmit water and will
yield significant quantities of water to wells.'42
a.

Geological Features that Influence Recharge

The manner in which water reaches the subterranean permeable strata
depends on the geological characteristics of the aquifer into which it flows. An

36. For example, it is often difficult to determine the precise boundaries of a groundwater
basin. The identity of parties whose activities can affect the quantity and quality of water within a
basin can only be determined when the physical limits of a basin have been defined.
37.

Michele Engel, Comment, Water Quality Control: The Reality of Priority in Utah

GroundwaterManagement, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 491,496 (1992).
38.

CAL. WATER CODE § 10752(a) (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

39.

See Peterson, supra note I1, at 1394.

40.

See Weber, supra note 9, at 669-72 (1994) ("hydrologists uniformly define an

aquifer simply as a rock unit that will yield water in usable quantity to a well or spring")
(citing R. Heath, Basic Groundwater Hydrology 4 (1982)).
41.

Gary Widman, Groundwater-Hydrologyand the Problem of Competing Well Owners, 14

ROcKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 523,525 (1968).
42.

GOvERNOR'S COMM. To REVIEW CAL. WATER RIGHrs LAw, ANAL REPoRr 174 (1978). Unlike

the term "aquifer," however, the definition of "groundwater basin" lacks precision and many
hydrologists speak only in terms of aquifers. See Weber, supra note 9, at 670. While there is a
considerable overlap between the two terms, a basin is the preferred water management term
because it focuses on the area of land overlying the subterranean structure and it recognizes that
multiple layers of hydrologically connected aquifers may underlie a single area. See id. at 670-71.
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aquifer is classified as either confined or unconfined. In a confined aquifer, a
permeable strata of rock, sand or gravel is surrounded by a layer of relatively
impermeable rock or clay, which acts as a barrier to the transmission of water
from outside the aquifer. 3 Confined aquifers can only be recharged at points
where the permeable strata comes into contact with the surface or porous soil"
or by penetrating the impermeable layer and forcing water into the basin. By
contrast, an unconfined aquifer has no such barrier and water can flow across
most of its surface area. 5 Thus, an aquifer can be recharged through the use of
spreading fields or natural percolation only if it has a sufficiently permeable
layer through which .the water can percolate.
b.

Determining a Groundwater Basin's Capacity to
Retain Water

The storage capacity of a groundwater basin is a function of the geological
material of which it is comprised. An aquifer has vacant space when the openings
between the soil particles, or soil strata, can hold more water." The amount of water
contained within a basin is dependent on the historic amounts of precipitation,
recharge and total outflows. For a groundwater basin to be an appropriate site for a
conjunctive use project, it must have the capacity to accept and retain a minimum
amount of imported surface water. Thus, one prerequisite to designation of a basin
for conjunctive use is the determination that there is sufficient unused storage
space to render the administration of the project economical.
Many aquifers are hydrologically connected to surface water systems and
to other aquifers; that is, they share a permeable layer through which water can
flow. The movement of water between hydrologically connected systems will
depend on the relative water levels in each system. For example, when the water
table of a groundwater basin intersects with a stream bed, the groundwater will
provide a base flow for the stream.47 In this circumstance, water added to the
basin will not increase the amount of water contained within the basin, but will
increase the flow of the connected stream. Similarly, extractions from a
groundwater basin can result in the lowering of the water table and cause water
from a connected surface water system to percolate into the basin. To'ensure

43. See Debbie Sivas, GroundwaterPollution from AgriculturalActivities: Policies for Protection, 7
STAN. ENVTL. L. 1.
-117, 118-19 (1987/1988).
44.

See V. PYE ET AL., GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1983). Some

aquifers are completely surrounded by an impenetrable layer and, therefore, are not capable
of receiving natural or intentional recharge. See id.
45. See id. Some aquifers are surrounded by aquitards which are confining beds that
retard but do not prevent the flow of water into and out of the aquifer.
46.

See Gregory, supra note 13, at 258, n. 116.

47.

Peterson, supra note 11,
at 1397-98.
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that water intentionally placed within an aquifer is retained, and that the
operation of a conjunctive use project will not interfere with the flow of surface
water systems, the project basin should be sufficiently isolated from adjacent
surface and groundwater systems.
c.

Geological Features that Affect the Extraction of
Water

As previously noted, water within a groundwater basin will flow with
relative ease throughout the permeable layer in which it is contained. The
mobility of water within the aquifer will depend on the hydraulic conductivity of
the basin material.4" Where a basin is comprised of porous granular deposits
such as sand and gravel, water will travel throughout the basin at a greater rate
than if the basin is comprised of fine grained material of low permeability such
as silts, clays, and tills which restrict the movement of groundwater.49 The
amount of energy that is required to extract water from a well will depend upon
the porosity of the material in the basin as well as the depth of the basin. Thus,
a basin that is located close to the surface and comprised of porous material
would be the most economical site for a conjunctive use project.0
d.

Groundwater Quality Considerations

Under a conjunctive use management scheme, native groundwater will
commingle with imported surface water. The quality of the water that is later
extracted, as well as the water that is contained within the basin, will be affected
by both sources. To ensure that neither source of water is unacceptably
degraded, the relative quality of both must be assessed prior to instituting the
conjunctive use program.
The quality of the native groundwater will be affected by the permeability of
the surface land overlying the aquifer. For example, if an unconfined aquifer lies
under an area of agricultural development, the retum flow from irrigation may carry
with it various salts, pesticides and other pollutants it picks up when it leaches
through the surface soil. This percolating return flow can increase the level of
contaminants in the aquifer and render the water stored within the basin unfit for

48. See Kevin Like. Patrick & Kelly E. Archer, A Comparison of State Groundwater Laws, 30
TULSA L.I. 123, 126 (1994).
49.

See CAUFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 3-48 to 3-49.

50. There may be risk associated with storing water within such a basin, however.
First, a basin that is close to the surface is more susceptible to contamination from activities
occurring on land overlying the basin. Second, the hydraulic conductivity of a basin controls
the mobility of contaminants within a basin. When contaminants reach a basin which is
comprised of highly porous material, the contaminants will migrate through the basin at a
fast rate and thereby impact the quality of all the water stored within the basin.
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some uses. Thus, a conjunctive use program may need to include control over the
type of uses to which the land overlying the basin can be dedicated.
As noted above, the operation of a conjunctive use project frequently involves
the recharge and discharge of large amounts of water from a basin. The fluctuation
in water levels can result in the change of gradient within the basin and thereby alter
the rate or direction of groundwater flow. This change in groundwater flow can have
several negative effects on the quality of water stored within the basin. For example,
"groundwater replenishment can result in accelerated groundwater degradation by
forcing contaminated water in the basin to flow towards wells."" The withdrawal of
project water also can exacerbate pollution problems within a basin by hastening
the rate at which pollutants are dispersed throughout the aquifer. 2 The level and
location of contaminants within a basin should, therefore, be assessed before
project water is recharged into it.
Moreover, the sudden draw down of water during times of extraction can
cause water of lesser quality to migrate into the basin from a hydrologically
connected aquifer or body of surface water. When a basin is adjacent to an ocean
or a saline aquifer, for example, the withdrawal of water can allow for intrusion of
saltwater into the freshwater aquifer and, if the intrusion occurs in large
quantities, render the water stored within the basin unusable without treatment. 3
The fact that a basin is adjacent to a saltwater body or a contaminated basin,
however, does not necessarily render it unsuitable for a groundwater storage
project. The operation of a conjunctive use project is likely to result in higher
groundwater levels than would occur without the project, even during times when
project water is extracted. Ifthe groundwater levels are maintained at a sufficiently
high level, the contaminated water will not migrate into the basin. Moreover, even
if the water table is significantly lowered during extraction, the flow of water from
an adjacent system can be prevented by the use of injection wells to create a
hydraulic barrier and block the movement of water into the basin.' 4 It is important
that the proximity of a contaminated water source be assessed, however, before a

51. Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for Groundwater Dispute Resolution in California: A
Glimpse at the Second Generation of Groundwater Issues and How Agencies Work Towards Problem
31,41 (1988).
Resolution, 20 PAcL. J.
52.

See Gregory, supra note 13, at 229.

53. See Kenneth A. Hodson, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutionality of
Intrastate GroundwaterManagement Programs, 62 TEx. L. REv. 537, 541 (1983). The presence of
saline in water significantly limits the uses to which water can be applied. "If as little as two
percent of the water in affected portion of the aquifer is saline, water from the aquifer is unfit
for human consumption." Id.
54. Several water agencies have used injection wells to prevent the influx of seawater
into overdrafted groundwater basins. See, e.g., Trager, supra note 51, at 40 (discussing a
program implemented by the Los Angeles County Flood Control District and the Orange
County Water District).
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conjunctive use project is implemented so that the potential
contamination and the cost of prevention can be evaluated.
2.

risk of

Definition and Priority of Water Rights

California has separate legal regimes for allocating and managing surface
water and groundwater. When the two systems intersect, as happens under a
conjunctive use program, the complexity of the disparate legal regimes creates
uncertainty as to how conflicts between different water users will be resolved.
The uncertainty may discourage participation in conjunctive use programs. For a
conjunctive use program to function, parties who depend on each source of
water must have assurances that their rights will not be impaired.
a.

Surface Water Rights

Under a conjunctive use program, parties with rights to surface water
voluntarily place a portion of their supply in a groundwater basin. "There are three
rights that are necessary for an imported groundwater banking project: the right to
place water in storage, the right to protect water while it is being stored, and the
right to withdraw the water for use.5 A surface water user can place water in a
basin either by contracting with overlying landowners or by purchasing land
overlying a basin and maintaining replenishment facilities. Before transporting
water to the basin, the party holding surface water rights will need assurances that
the basin has sufficient available storage space to accept the project water. To
protect the water while it is in storage, the owner of surface water rights must have
legal assurance that she will retain title to the water and can, therefore, prevent
others from interfering with her right. The surface water user also must have some
authority to prevent others from taking actions which would result in the
degradation of the quality of the water so stored. Finally, the surface water user
must have the ability to extract the water from the basin in times of shortage and
to transport the water to places of use wherever the need occurs.
b.

Groundwater Rights

A conjunctive use project also may affect the rights of parties who depend
on groundwater. To encourage parties who control the management of
groundwater basins to participate in such projects, as well as to ensure that the
operation of such a program does not result in the unacceptable impairment of
vested rights, groundwater users must have assurances that native groundwater
supplies will not be diminished and that the quality of water will not be
degraded due to the operation of the project. Groundwater users currently have

55.

Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1246.

West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008

the right to utilize the safe yield of a groundwater basin. If imported water fills
all the useable storage in a groundwater basin and prevents natural recharge
from reaching the basin, the operation of a conjunctive use project could result
in the diminution of available water. Groundwater users with rights to the native
supplies must be assured that this will not occur or that they will be
compensated for the displacement of native recharge." In addition, to protect
the quality of the native supplies, groundwater users also must have the legal
authority to prevent both the introduction of poor quality water into the basin
and the recharge or extraction practices that could degrade the water quality.
Finally, groundwater users will need assurances that the extraction of imported
water will not interfere with their existing wells.
3.

Other Externalities

The operation of a conjunctive use program has the potential to infringe on
the property rights of nonparticipants and to cause environmental damage,
including subsidence of surface land, permanent loss of groundwater storage
capacity through compaction, flooding of overlying lands, degradation of the
quality of water stored in the basin, interference with the water rights of nonparticipants in the program, impairment of overlying wells, reduction in native
groundwater supply and damage to surface vegetation. Before the benefits of a
conjunctive use project can be accurately evaluated, these risks must be assessed.
a.

Land Subsidence

Aquifers are composed of compressible material. When water is withdrawn
from an aquifer, the pressure within it may be reduced and may result in the
compaction of the water bearing strata." When the materials within an aquifer
compress, the overlying surface may subside. Subsidence can adversely affect the
physical integrity of surface structures such as roads, buildings and water
distribution systems; alter the .gradients and drainage patterns of canals and
irrigated' land; and cause low lying areas to become submerged." Depletion of
groundwater supplies has caused land subsidence in California in the past. For

56. See, e.g., Alpaugh Irrigation Dist. V.City of Riverside, 113 Cal. App. 2d 286, 292 (1950).
DWR defines "safe yield" as "the maximum quantity of water that can be continuously withdrawn
from a groundwater basin without adverse effect. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RESOURcES, BULL, 118,
CAurFor's GROUNDWATER 4 (1975). A number of water managers and commentators have
criticized the concept of safe yield as being inherently subjective and hydrologically unsound. See
Weber, supra note 9, at 673-77; Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1242-44.
57.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 55.

58.

See Peterson, supra note 1I, at 1395.

59.

See Amandes, supra note 31..
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example, parts of the Santa Clara Valley subsided by more than thirteen feet
between 1933 and 1967 as a result of overdraft of the underlying basin.'
Indeed, the very existence of conjunctive management may increase the
risk of subsidence. Under a typical conjunctive use scheme, water is withdrawn
from an aquifer when surface water supplies are scarce. During these times, the
natural recharge of the basin also is reduced. Therefore, the sudden withdrawal
of large quantities of water stored within the basin can result in a significant
reduction of the pressure within an aquifer and cause it to collapse. If a
groundwater basin historically has experienced large fluctuations in water levels
without experiencing subsistence, however, the risk of subsidence from
conjunctive use may be minimal.
b.

Loss of Basin Storage Capacity

When a groundwater basin compacts, the finer sediments within the water
bearing strata lose porosity." The pore space reduction caused by the
compaction reduces the amount of water that the aquifer can store. This
deformation of an aquifer's sediments is irreversible, and the basin's lost
storage capacity can never be recovered. 2 The loss of storage space, thus,
diminishes the ability of the water managers to use groundwater basins to their
fullest potential.
c.

Flooding

During years of high precipitation, the natural recharge of water into a
groundwater basin can cause it to fill to overflowing. 63 During such periods, water
tables may rise to the surface and cause flooding. of overlying land. 4 If a
groundwater basin does not have adequate storage space available, the operation of
a conjunctive use program may exacerbate the risk of overfill and flooding.
d.

Degradation of Water Quality

The operation of a conjunctive use project also can result in the
degradation of the quality of water stored within a basin. The effects of such
degradation are not limited to those who use the groundwater. If the aquifer is

60.
61.

Seeid. at 1213.
See Peterson, supra note 11, at 1396.

62.

See Amandes, supra note 31, at 1210.

63.

See Anderson, supra note 17, at 570.

64.

See id. (describing the damage that the City of San Bernardino suffered when, as a

result of natural recharge and a groundwater recharge program, the Bunker Hill basin
flooded low lying land in the city).
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hydrologically connected to a surface water system, the contamination of
groundwater resources can impair the ecosystem that depends on the
connected water system.6 5
e.

Impairment of Wells

Finally, when water is pumped from an aquifer, a cone of depression in the
water table is created around the point of extraction. If a large quantity of water
is withdrawn over a short period of time, the cone of depression created by the
pumping may significantly lower the water levels in the area surrounding the
extraction facility. This draw-down can temporarily impair the flow of water to
neighboring wells. Further, if the extraction of the project water substantially
lowers the water table, existing wells may have to be deepened and more energy
will have to be expended to pump water from greater depths.'
4.

Incentives for Participation

As the foregoing indicates, there are significant costs and risks associated with
participation in conjunctive use programs. In most cases, the parties involved in the
program will have to install pumps, monitoring wells and recharge facilities. In some
cases, they may have to construct a water transportation system or secure the right
to use existing conveyance facilities. The transaction costs of conjunctive
management also may be significant because the parties will need to broker
agreements to establish methods for obtaining surface water for import and
recharge, schedules for recharging into and extracting water from the basin, and a
means of supervising compliance with the agreements.
In addition, the operation of a conjunctive use program has the potential to
impair the water rights of third parties. Disputes over groundwater rights usually
are both protracted and costly.67 If the third party's challenge is successful, the
participants in the conjunctive use program may lose the benefits of their invested
capital. Even if the legal challenge is ultimately unsuccessful, the project may be
delayed if a court issues a preliminary injunction and such delay could be lengthy
and costly.' Additionally, the participants in the program run the risk of incurring
liabilities for third party damages that result from operation of the program.
Therefore, to encourage parties to voluntarily participate in conjunctive use

65.
66.
67.

See Gregory, supra note 13, at 238.
See Hodson, supra note 53, at 541.
See Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1227; Frank I.Trelease, Legal Solutions to Groundwater

-Problems:A General Overview, II PAc. L.J.863,867-68 (1980).

68. See Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1229 (estimating that the granting of a preliminary
injunction to a party challenging the legality of the Kem County Water Bank could cost the
DWR six to eight million dollars in interest expenses alone).
1120
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programs, it is essential that these types of risks be minimized and that liability to
third parties be clearly assigned.
Iil.

Legal and Institutional Regimes for Regulation of Groundwater

The California Water Code does not comprehensively regulate the use of
groundwater. Consequently, groundwater management has evolved through a
combination of appellate court decisions and local agency rulemaking. 9
Overlying these rules are myriad state and federal statutes,0 Article X, Section 2
of the California Constitution, and a variety of contracts that interact to direct
how particular groundwater resources are allocated and used. The story of
California groundwater rights, thus, is the story of the development of these
decentralized rules and the tensions among them.
Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution is the cornerstone of
California's water law and policy. 7' It requires that all uses of water be both

reasonable and beneficial. No one can obtain or hold a water right unless the
water is used in a reasonable manner, for a beneficial purpose and through a
reasonable-method of diversion. The California Water Code authorizes the State
Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB" or "Board") to take all appropriate
measures to prevent the waste or misuse of any water in the state.12 Thus, all
water users are subject to the reasonable use requirement.
California recognizes several categories of water rights, each based on
hydrological characteristics. Rights in surface water are governed by the

69.

See Kevin Neese, Tehama County Groundwater Management Ordinance, in MAKING THE

CONNECTIONS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUNDWATER 47, 48
DeVeries & J.Woled eds. 1996) [hereinafter MAING THE CONNECTIONS.
70.

(J.1.

See, e.g., Federal Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988); Central

Valley Project Management Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3401-3412, 106 Stat.
4706 (1992); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-666; California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §2 1000 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); Califomia Endangered Species Act, CAL. FISH & GAME
CODE§ 2050 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
71.

Article X, Section 2 declares, inter alia, 'that because of conditions prevailing in this

state the general welfare requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use to
the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or
unreasonable method of use of water is prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to
be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural
stream or water course in this state is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does and shall not extend to waste or
unreasonable method of diversion. Cal. Const. art. X, § 2.
72.

CAL.WATER CODE § 275 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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doctrines of riparianism and prior appropriation.7 3 Rights to subterranean
waters are based on ownership of overlying land and appropriation.74 According
to the California Supreme Court, "Iclonceptually, what is meant by a water right
is the right to use the water-to divert it from its natural course.'M This right to
use water is a real property right, 7' and real property remedies, therefore, are
available for invasions of water rights. 7
The right to use groundwater depends on the geological formation in which
the water is found. "For legal purposes, underground waters are divided into three
categories: (1)the underflow of surface stream; (2) a definite underground stream;
and (3) percolating waters. 7 1 Underflow and water in underground streams are
subject to the rules governing rights in surface water.79 To acquire a right in
underflow or water in underground streams, one must either own land contiguous
to the watercourse of which the underflow or underground stream is a part or obtain
a permit or license from the SWRCB to use such water."0
Califomia law presumes that all subterranean water is percolating.8' A
claimant who wants to appropriate groundwater through the statutory procedure
has the burden of proving that the water is part of an underground stream system.82

73.

See United States v. State Water resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 101 (1986).

74.

See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 47-53.

75.

State Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 100. Before 1903, the right to

percolating waters was controlled by the same common law principles that govemed rights
over rocks and minerals contained in land. The owner of land overlying percolating waters
had absolute ownership in and control of the use of the percolating waters and adjacent
landowners could not prevent an overlying owner from diverting all groundwater found
under his land even where such diversion injured the adjacent owner's groundwater rights.
See 62 CAL.JUR. 3d § 394 (1981). In Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California Supreme Court rejected
the common law rule of absolute ownership of percolating waters and adopted the doctrine
of correlative rights under which all proprietors of land overlying a groundwater basin share
in common the right to use the groundwater. 141 Cal. 138 (1903).
76.

See Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Miller & Luxury, 183 Cal. 71,81 (1920).

77.

See Miller & Luxv. Enterprise Canal & Land Co., 169 Cal. 71,81 (1915).

78.

LnTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 48.

79.

See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, II Cal. 2d 501, 536 (1938); City of Los Angeles

v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 623-35 (1890); Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal. 2d 549, 557-62 (1944); CAL.
WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
80.

CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

81.

See Pomeroy, 124 Cal. At 628, 633-34.

82.

In determining whether groundwater is percolating or part of a stream system, a

court considers the following factors: whether the water flows through a defined channel, the
direction and rate of the subsurface flow, and the relationship between the surface and
subsurface hydrographs. See Cave v. Tyler, 147 Cal. 454, 456 (1905); Larsen v. Appollonio, 5 Cal.
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Percolating waters include water in underground basins and groundwater that has
escaped from streams.5 3 As discussed below, common law principles govern the
allocation of percolating groundwater. The California legislature consistently has
followed a hands-off policy with regard to the regulation of groundwater rights. 4
These rights are generally not defined or quantified.
A.

Acquisition of Groundwater Rights

'Water begins its juridical life as the quintessential public resource: owned by no
one individual but held in common by all." 5 One can convert the publidy-owned
water into private property "by appropriation in the manner provided by law.' Because
the state legislature has generally not regulated groundwater, "the manner provided by
law" has been judicially defined. Over the last 100 years, the courts have developed the
majority of rules relating to the character and scope of groundwater rights in California.
The California'Supreme Court established the basic rule governing groundwater
rights in Katz v. Walkinshaw. 7 In Katz, the plaintiffs were overlying landowners who had
used groundwater obtained from artesian wells to irrigate their land for twenty years.8"
The defendant, an owner of land overlying the same aquifer as the plaintiffs' land,
extracted groundwater and sold it for use on non-overlying land.89 The plaintiffs alleged
that continuation of the defendant's water exportation had destroyed the artesian head
of their wells, effectively prohibiting the continued use of their property."
The court in Katz concluded that, due to California's arid climate, the ends
of justice would not be served by adopting the English common law rule of
absolute ownership of percolating groundwater. 9' It recognized that, because
water is a scarce resource in California, the rule of absolute ownership would

2d 440, 444 (1936); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Legal Disconnections Between Surface Water and Ground
Water, in MAKING THE CONNECrIONS, supra note 69, at 21. See also Arroyo Ditch & Water Co. v.
Baldwin, 155 Cal. 280, 284 (1909) (one claiming a right in groundwater has the burden of
proving that the water is part of a flowing stream); Russell Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1232-33.
Problems, 45 CAL. L.REv. 688 (1957).
See generally Wells A Hutchins, CaliforniaGround Water: Lgal
83.

See Montecito Valley Water Co. v. City of Santa Barbara, 144 Cal. 578, 584 (1904).

84.

See Thompson, supra note 5,at 722.

85. Gregory A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools
for Augmenting Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVrL. L. J.3, 12, (1996).
86.

CAL. WATERCODE§ 102 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

87.

141 Cal. 116(1903).

88.

at 138.
Id.

89.

See id.

90. See id.
91.

Id.at 123-38.
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result in unacceptable uncertainty in titles to water rights. 92 Instead, the court
adopted the rule of reasonable use of percolating waters and the doctrine of
correlative rights. 93 Under this doctrine, all overlying landowners have an equal
right to the beneficial use of water. Where there is insufficient supply to meet
the overlying owners' demands, all must equally share in the shortage. 4
Groundwater that is surplus to the reasonable and beneficial needs of the
overlying owners is available for appropriation for use outside the basin."
Unlike surface water, underflow or underground stream water,. there is no
statutory procedure for perfecting an appropriative right to groundwater.96
Moreover, no centralized agency makes the determination of whether a basin
contains water that is available for appropriation. 97 One gains an appropriative
right to groundwater simply by taking it and applying it to a beneficial use.9"
Appropriative rights are governed by the "first in time, first in right" doctrine. If
overlying owners require the full safe yield of a basin to satisfy their reasonable,
beneficial uses, however, no surplus exists and no water is available for
appropriation.99 The correlative rights of overlying landowners, like riparian
rights, do not depend upon use and are not lost by nonuse.' °°

92.

Seeid. at 128.

93.

See id.at 134-36.

94.

See id.

95: See id. at 135-36; see also Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. V. Armstrong,
49 Cal. App. 3d 992, 1001 (1975). "A groundwater basin is in a state of surplus when the
amount of water being extracted is less than the maximum that could be withdrawn without
adverse effects on the basin's long term supply. Overdraft commences whenever extractions
increase, or the withdrawable maximum decreases, or both, to the point where the surplus
ends." Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 368, 371 n.2 (1985).
96.

CAL.WATERCODE § 1200 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993); see also Katz, 141 Cal. At 134-35.
97. By contrast, section 1375 of the Water Code provides that the SWRCB must make a
determination that unappropriated water is available before it can grant a permit. The Water Code
further provides that Aliin determining the amount of water available for appropriation, the board
shall take into account, whenever it is in the public interest, the amounts of water needed to remain
in the source for protecting beneficial uses, induding any uses specified to be protected in any
relevant water quality control plan established pursuant to Division 7 (commencing with Section
13000) of this code." CAL WATER CODE § 1243.5 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).
98.

See Hutchins, supra note 82, at 688.

99. See Corona Foothill Lemon Co. v. Lillibridge, 8 Cal. 2d 522, 531 (1937); see also
Monolith Portland Cement Co. v. Mojave Pub. Util. Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 487,494 (1957).
100. See, e.g., Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617, 627-28 (1909); Burr v. Maclay Rancho
Water Co., 160 Cal. 268, 280; City of San Bemardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 25 (1921);
Orange County Water Dist. v. City of Riverside, 173 Cal. App. 2d 137, 165 (1959).
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Public purveyors of groundwater may not assert the overlying rights of their
customers; rather, they must exercise appropriative rights.'"' Thus, the rights of private
overlying users are technically paramount to the needs of public agencies that depend
on groundwater.' 2 In overdrafted basins, however, public agencies may establish
prescriptive rights against private groundwater users. Such prescriptive rights may
become superior to the overlying landowners' rights. Additionally, intervening public
use may limit a private owner's water rights remedy to damages, in place of an
injunction, where public policy considerations require a reallocation of water rights.0 3
An importer of water has an exclusive right to recapture the retum flow'
attributed to its deliveries of imported water' 5 to users in a basin.' 6 Additionally,
public agencies are entitled to use underground basins for temporary storage of
imported water by means of artificial recharge and subsequent recapture and to
protect the water so stored from expropriation by others.' 7 The owner of stored water
has a right to extract an equivalent amount, less losses.' 8 "No statewide permit
system exists for the allocation of underground storage capacity, nor is the permission
of landowners overlying the storage area required in order to store imported water
underground."'0 9 The importer of stored water may be liable, however, for third-party
damages that result from the storage project." 0

101.

See City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 25 (1921); see also

Orange County Water Dist. v. City of Riverside, 173 Cal. App. 2d 137,165 (1959).
102.

See LrTrLEWORTH &GARNER, supra note 16, at 51.

103. See id.at 51.
104. Where diverted surface water or pumped groundwater is applied to surface use,
a certain amount of water is not consumed but rather percolated back into the ground. This
water is called "return flow."

105.

"Imported water" is "foreign water imported from a different watershed." City of

Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 261 n.51 (1975).
106.

See id.at 262.

107.

See id.at 263-64.

108.

See id.

109.

LrrrLEWORTH &GARNER, supra note 16, at 51.

110. See Anderson, supra note 17, at 570 (discussing damage that resulted to streets,
building and pipelines in San Bernardino when natural and intentional recharge combined

to cause the Bunker Hill Basin to overflow).
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B.

Limitations on Groundwater Rights

Although some observers contend that there is no groundwater
management program in California,"' there are a variety of methods by which
groundwater basins are managed, and a number of important basins are tightly
regulated. While no agency has comprehensive authority to define the character
or extent of groundwater rights, the courts have jurisdiction to determine some
groundwater rights and to limit pumping through adjudication. The role of the
courts in determining groundwater rights has evolved over the last hundred
years from a narrow one of resolving discrete conflicts between groundwater
users to a broad one of developing comprehensive plans for allocation of
groundwater in particular basins. In addition, the California Water Code grants
the SWRCB and various local agencies some groundwater management
authority. By virtue of their police power, cities and counties also can regulate
some aspects of groundwater use. Finally, various federal and state statutes may
affect a water user's exercise of its groundwater rights.
I.

Adjudication

Adjudication is a method of regulating groundwater use in basins that are
in a state of overdraft." 2 When a basin is in overdraft there is no surplus water
available for the acquisition or enlargement of appropriative rights.
Appropriations in excess of the surplus invade senior appropriators' and
overlying water owners' rights, which usually entitle them to an injunction." 3
One product of the adjudication is judicial determination of the nature and
quantity of each groundwater user's share of the basin's safe yield."4
In defining a groundwater user's water rights, the court must consider the
reasonableness of each use. The determination of what is a reasonable use of
water will vary with the facts and circumstances of each particular case."' A
court adjudicating a groundwater basin must consider the needs of all other
users of the groundwater. As the California Supreme Court held:
What may be a reasonable beneficial use, where water is present in excess
of all needs, would not be a reasonable beneficial use in an area of great

Ill. See, e.g., Eric L. Gamer et al., Institutional Reforms in California Groundwater Law, 25
PAc. L. 1.1021, 1022 (1994) (describing California groundwater law as "the right to pump as
much water as possible until one is sued").

1126

112.

See Neese, supra note 69, at 48.

113.

See People v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 695 (1950).

114.

See Neese, supra note 69, at 49.

115.

Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567 (1935).
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scarcity and great need. What is a beneficial use at one time, may because
of changed conditions, become a waste of water at a later time."6
The inquiry into the reasonableness of a particular use also must include what the
Supreme Court has called "state-wide considerations of transcendent
importance.""'7 The Court has stated that a paramount consideration in making this
determination is "the ever increasing need for the conservation of water in this state,
an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its express recognition in [Article X,
Section 21.""8 Thus, a court adjudicating the rights of producers in a particular basin
has the duty to consider the reasonableness of a particular use in the broader
context of current water needs of all of California. If a producer's use is found to be
unreasonable given competing demands, either basin-wide or state-wide, the court
can find that the producer has no right to use such water." 9 The Califomia Supreme
Court has not yet decided whether Article X, Section 2 requires the optimal use of
2
water, or if it simply prohibits the wasteful use of water. 1
While a court has the authority to determine the existence, extent, and
character of a groundwater user's exercised rights, a court cannot determine the
prospective rights of overlying landowners. In Wright v. Goleta Water District,'2' the
court of appeal held that a judicial determination of basin rights is only binding
on parties to the litigation because an adjudication of groundwater rights is
essentially a private lawsuit. 2 2 In Wright, the court rejected the trial judge's
decision to subordinate an unexercised overlying right to an exercised
appropriative right.'23 The trial court had based its holding upon the California
Supreme Court's reasoning in In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System. 24 Long
Valley held that the SWRCB could relegate unexercised riparian rights to the25
lowest priority in a basin-wide statutory adjudication of surface water rights.
The Long Valley court recognized that, in this context, uncertainty concerning
water rights could inhibit long-range planning and foster litigation. 26

116.

Id.

117.

Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 140 (1967).

118.

Id.

119.

See id.

120. See LFITLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16,.at 69; see also Nat'l Audobon Soc'y v.
Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 447 n.28 (1983).
121.

174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).

122.

Id.at 87-89.

123.

Id.

124.

25 Cal. 3d 339 (1979); see also 174 Cal. App. 3d at 86.

125.

25 Cal. 3d at 359.

126.

Id.at 355.
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In Wright, the court of appeal observed that such concerns should apply
with "equal vigor" to groundwater since the legislature had failed to enact a
groundwater regulatory scheme to carry out the state's constitutional water
policies.'27 The court concluded, however, that the doctrine of stare decisis, as well
as due process concerns, prevented it from redefining a nonparty's groundwater
"
rights. 28
' The court stressed the fundamental difference between judicial
determination of groundwater rights and the SWRCB's adjudication procedures
at issue in Long Valley. 29 In a statutory adjudication, the SWRCB engages in a
comprehensive and final determination of all water rights in the system. 3 ' The
court reasoned that this consideration "transcendisl those at stake in a private
dispute between a limited number of parties."''
While an overlying owner cannot lose her rights to use water in an underground
basin by nonuse,'32 she may lose them through prescription. "' When an appropriator
takes water from a basin that is not surplus, she invades overlying owners' and senior
appropriators' right to use the groundwater.'34 An appropriator's extraction and export
of non-surplus water may ripen into a prescriptive right when the essential elements of
adverse possession are met.'35 In particular, the overlying owner must have notice of

127.

174 Cal. App. 3d at 86.

128.

See id. at 87.

129.

See id. at 86-90. The California Water Code expressly authorizes the SWRCB "to

determine [in a stream system adjudication proceeding] all rights to water of a stream
system whether based upon appropriation, riparian right, or other basis of right." CAL.

WATER

CODE § 2501 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
130.

The California Water Code provides that it is the duty of all daimants to appear and

submit proof of their claims in a statutory adjudication proceeding. A claimant who fails to appear
"shall be barred and stopped from subsequently asserting any rights theretofore acquired and shall
be held to have forfeited all rights to water theretofore claimed by him on the stream system, other
than as provided in the decree, unless entitled to relief under the laws of this state." Id.§ 2774.
131.

L'ng Valley, 25 Cal. 3d at 360.

132.

See Hudson v. Dailey, 156 Cal. 617,627-28 (1909).

133.

It is not clear, however, whether overlying rights that have not yet been

exercised can be lost by prescription. In a cryptic footnote, the California Supreme Court has
stated that the prescriptive rights of appropriators "would not necessarily impair the private
defendants' right to ground water for new overlying uses for which the need had not yet
come into existence during the prescriptive period." City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Femando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293 n. 100'(1975).
134.

See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 929 (1949).

135.

To obtain a prescriptive water right, the use must be reasonable and beneficial, open

and notorious, adverse and hostile, continuous and uninterrupted for a period of five years,
exclusive and under daim of right. See Saxon v. DuBois, 209 Cal. App. 2d 713, 719 (1962).
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the adverse use.'36 Moreover, the basin must be in a continuous state of overdraft for
the prescriptive period.' 37 A prescriptive right entitles the adverse user to use the water
for the specific purpose for which the water has historically been used and in a specific
quantity.'38
The doctrine of mutual prescription adopted by the Supreme Court in
Pasadena v. Alhambra'39 fundamentally shaped groundwater adjudications. Under
this law, when a basin does not contain sufficient water to satisfy the needs of
the overlying producers over a protracted period, all appropriators and overlying
owners invade each other's water rights. Therefore, each user can gain
prescriptive rights vis-a-vis all other users.'4 ° The court can limit pumping to the
basin's safe yield' 4 ' and require all users proportionately to reduce their
extractions. 42 Groundwater rights are allocated on the basis of historic pumping
rates, as represented by the five prior years of record for each extractor. '
The California Supreme Court modified the doctrine of mutual
prescription in Los Angeles v. San Fernando.'"The court held that section 1007 of
the Civil Code prohibits prescriptive rights from accruing against public
agencies and public utilities.' 45 This limitation is particularly significant because
there are "not many groundwater basins that do not have some public users."'46
Thus, individuals are prohibited from gaining mutual prescriptive rights to much
of the groundwater in California and run the risk of losing their water rights to

136. See Los Angeles v. San Femando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 282 (1975) (stating that a
prescriptive period does not commence until water users with paramount rights have notice
that an overdraft exists); See also Pasadena, 33 Cal. 2d at 930 (holding that the long-term
lowering of water levels is sufficient to charge owners with notice of deficiency).
137.

See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 284.

138.

See City of San Bemardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 25, 31 (1921).

139. 33 Cal. 2d 908 (1949).
140. See id.
at 933.
141.

See id.
at 924.

142. See id.
at 936.
143.

See id.

144.

14Cal. 3d 199(1975).

145. The court stated that "occupancy for the period prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure as sufficient to bar any action for the recovery of the property confers a title
thereto, denominated by a title by prescription, which is sufficient against all, but no
possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long continued of any land,
water, water right, easement, or other property whatsoever dedicated to a public use by a
public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity, shall ever ripen into
any title, interest or right against the owner thereof." Id.at 270 n.66.
146.

Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1238.
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public agencies. 47 The court further limited the potential impact of prescriptive
rights by holding that users of the native supply in the basin cannot gain
prescriptive rights to imported water stored in a basin. 4 '
Once a court has determined the relative rights of water users in a basin, it
usually will appoint a watermaster to manage the basin.'49 The court order often
grants the watermaster authority to charge groundwater producers special
assessments to cover the cost of administering the judgment. 5 ' In many
adjudicated basins, the watermaster also is empowered to operate
replenishment programs to prevent future overdrafts.' Once a groundwater
basin is adjudicated, the trial court usually retains jurisdiction to modify its
orders as conditions may change. 2 Generally, a watermaster does not have the
power to regulate the extractions of groundwater to control the movement of
contamination in a basin or the land use practices of overlying land owners to
prevent contamination in a recharge area. ' The watermaster may petition the
court, however, to modify the order to allow the watermaster to regulate some
additional aspects of groundwater extraction and management."4

147. See id. at 1227 (noting that the San Fernando decision reduced the incentive for
private users to instigate basin adjudication proceeding because public agencies whose
withdrawal of water from the basin would be protected from loss of rights by prescription);
see also Thompson, supra note 5, at 686-700 (discussing the dominant role that local water
institutions play inallocating and managing water resources in the western United States).
148.

See San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 270-77, 286-87. Because San Fernando involved public

importers of water, it is not entirely dear whether a party could gain prescriptive rights against a
private importer of water. It seems likely, however, that the policy reasons for exempting public
importers from the doctrine of prescriptive rights would apply with equal vigor to private importers
and a court would find that prescriptive rights do not attach to importer water. See id.at 261 (noting

that the reason for giving priority to users who import water is "tocredit the importer with the fruits of
his expenditures and endeavors inbringing into the basin water that would not otherwise be there").
149.

See ANNE I. SCHNEIDER,

GROUNDWATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION

To REvIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS 53-58 (1977) (describing watermaster management).
150.

See id. at 22-25.

151.

See id.

152. See, e.g., Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d
489, 524-25 (1935).
153.

See BLomOUIST, supra note 19, at 175-76 (discussing how the San Gabriel Basin

watermaster had to petition the court to limit pumping for quality reasons).
154. See id. For example, the court granted the watermaster for the San Gabriel Basin
the authority to limit extracts to help prevent the spread of contaminants within the basin
and to facilitate remediation in 1990. In 1991, the court approved the watermaster's plan for

implementing this authority. Similar water quality authority was granted to the Upper Los
Angeles River Area watermaster in 1993. See CAuFoRNIA DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER
FACTS No.

3: ADJUDICATED

GROUNDWATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA (1996).
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Basin-wide adjudication can increase the certainty of water rights because
the outcome includes defined and quantified pumping rights. "Definition of
water rights allows for prioritization in the event of shortage and quantification
accommodates internal water transfers.""' Courts also have the flexibility
individually to address problems that are specific to the basin and to craft
equitable remedies tailored to address the unique conditions of the basin.
There are several concomitant drawbacks to the adjudication process, however.
Groundwater adjudication is generally a time-consuming and costly process. 6 The
participants are required to forfeit their rights independently to devise solutions to
future problems and to abdicate control over their water use practices to the court and
watermaster. Moreover, water users only have an incentive to utilize the adjudicative
process to define water rights when a basin has suffered a protracted period of
overdraft. Because a basin and the water contained within it can be severely damaged
by long periods of overdraft, water users are unlikely to use the adjudicative process to
ensure that the basin is maintained in its most productive state. Finally, the very
nature of the adjudicative process requires judges to make important policy decisions
without legislative guidance.'"
2.

State Water Resources Control Board

While the California Water Code assigns the primary duty of regulating water
resources to the State Water Resources Control Board,'" it does not grant the Board
direct regulatory jurisdiction over groundwater.'" The SWRCB does have some
authority, however, to regulate groundwater rights. The SWRCB has concurrent
jurisdiction with the courts to enforce the reasonable and beneficial use
requirement of Article X, Section 2 on all water uses.'" Section 275 of the Water

155.

Neese, supra note 69, at 49.

156. For example, it took twenty years to adjudicate the San Fernando Basin and the
adjudication of the Raymond Basin took twelve years to complete. See Garner et al., supra
note 11,at 1023; see also BLOMoUIsT, supra note 19, at 73-95 (describing the adjudication
proceedings in the Raymond Basin); 97-126 (analyzing the problems and solutions
developed in the West Basin proceedings); 127-58 (discussing the Central Basin).
157.

See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 174 Cal. App. 3d 368 (1985).

158.

See, e.g.,CAL. WATER CODE § 1200-1851 (West 1992 &Supp, 1993).

159.

See id.at § 1202.

160. See Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. [hereinafter lID I],
186 Cal. App. 3d 1160, 1162-63, 1171 (1986) (finding that the SWRCB has the authority to
adjudicate the constitutional issue of the unreasonable use of water); Imperial Irrigation Dist. v.
State Water Resources Control Bd. [hereinafter lID I11,
225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 561 (1990)
(concluding that the SWRCB had the power to establish standards of reasonableness and to
determine whether the irrigation practices of the district were reasonable or wasteful). The Board
has been reluctant to exercise its authority under the reasonable use doctrine to reduce a user's
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Code further provides that DWR and the Board "shall take all appropriate
proceedings or actions before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to prevent
waste, unreasonable use, unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method of
diversion of water in this state."'' The SWRCB also "has broad authority to define
reasonable water use, to investigate alleged misuses, and to order the violating
party to correct the misuse through various means, including implementation of
water conservation measures"'6 2 and it is "the primary state agency with jurisdiction
over the implementation and enforcement of federal and state water quality law."'63
Although the California Water Code does not authorize the SWRCB to
determine groundwater rights in a statutory adjudication of a stream system," 4
it can act as a referee to court adjudications of groundwater basins.' A court
can refer matters to the SWRCB to investigate and report on any issue involved
in a lawsuit for the determination of rights to water.' 'Any
party may take an
exception to the Board's findings, however, and thereby require a trial court to
conduct a de novo review. 6 7 The SWRCB can also initiate an adjudicative
proceeding in courts to protect groundwater quality.
3.

Local Management of Groundwater Basins

While the California Water Code does not authorize the Board, or any
other state agency, to comprehensively regulate groundwater rights, the
legislature has granted various local entities some authority to manage

water rights, or to require users to implement conservation methods, because of the expense
involved in investigating waste and improving water efficiency. See, e.g., George W. Pring & Karen
A Tomb, License to Waste: Legal Barries to Conservation and Efficient Use of Water in the West, 25 RocKY MT.
MIN. LIKE. INST. 25-1, 25-8 to 25-32 (1972); Steven J.
Shupe, Waste inWestern Water Law: A Blueprint fr
Change, 61 OR.L. REv. 483, 485-91 (1982); but see Thompson, supra note 5, at 729-30 (discussing
SWRCB's order finding that the Imperial Irrigation District's water use practices were
unreasonable and wasteful in violation of constitutional mandate).
161.

CAL. WATER CODE § 275 (West 1992 &Supp.).

162.

Thomas, supra note 85, at 26.

163. Gray, supra note 15, at 249 n.I(referencing CAL. WATER CODE § 13000-14920
(West 1992 &Supp. 1993).
164.

CAL. WATERCODE § 2500 (West 1992 & Supp.).

165.

See id.§ 2000.

166.

See id.

167.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 2017; see also LrTTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 16, at 106-

07 (describing how the court in Environmental Defense Fund v. East Bay Municipal Utility District, 26
Cal. 3d 327 (1980), had to conduct a lengthy trial after the parties took exceptions to the
SWRCB's resolutions of issues).
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groundwater basins.'" Local water agencies play a vital role in the allocation of
the state's water resources, because they often hold legal title to water rights for
the benefit of their users, control extraction and conveyance facilities, and are
responsible for delivering water to consumers."' The use of institutions to
supply water is not surprising because the economies of scale involved in the
development and distribution of water resources make it far less expensive for
an institution to maintain large extraction or diversion facilities and "to
transport water to a number of consumers in the same region than for each
''
consumer to collect and bring in her own water."
The establishment of local
agencies endowed with some governmental powers also allows local water
users, who control water agencies through voting rights, to overcome some of
the uncertainties engendered by California's complex and multi-layered system
for regulating water uses and to manage water rights equitably and efficiently.
California has several different types of local agencies with the authority to
manage and regulate the state's groundwater resources.
a.

Special Act Districts

Through the enactment of special district acts, the legislature has created (or
authorized the creation of) public agencies to regulate groundwater use in specific

168.

California has a long history of using local districts to fulfill a variety of public

purposes. In 1887, the legislature enacted the Wright Act, which authorized the formation of

irrigation districts with the power to issue bonds and charge assessments against all property
within the district for the purpose of developing or acquiring water for irrigation uses. See DoNALD
WORSrER, RjvERSOF EMPIRE: WATER, ARDrry,ANDTHEGROwrHOFThEAMERICANWESr 108-09 (1985).
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Fallbrook Dist. v, Bradley,
164 U.S. 122 (1896). The court deferred to the California legislature's determination that the
public generally, and not just those who received water deliveries from the district, benefited

from the district's services. The Court stated:
To irrigate and thus bring into possible cultivation these large masses of otherwise
worthless lands would seem to be a public purpose and a matter of public interest, not

confined to the landowners, or even to any one section of the state. The fact that the use of
water is limited to the landowner isnot therefore a fatal objection to this legislation. It isnot
essential that the entire community or even any considerable portion thereof should
directly enjoy or participate in an improvement inorder to constitute a public use.
Id.
at 161.
169. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 686-701 (describing the role that water
institutions play in the allocation of water resources in the western United States).
170. Id.at 689; see also Robert A Young, Why Are There So Few Transactions Among Water
Users, AM. I. AGRrC ECON. 1143, 1144 (1986); John M. McDowell & Keith R_Ugone, The Ffft of
InstitutionalSettingon Bdaviorin Public Enterprises:Irrigation Disticts intheWestern Stats, 1982 ARIz. Sr. L.
I. 453,
480-82 (discussing the economies of scale involved in storing, transporting and distributing water).
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basins. 7 ' Special water districts are designed to preserve "the groundwater resources
within the territory of the agency for agricultural and municipal and industrial uses."'7 2
The legislature has declared that the creation of special groundwater districts "is in the
public interest and that the creation of the [groundwater management agencies] ... is
for the common benefit of water users."'

3

Special groundwater management districts possess a wide array of tools
to carry out their mandate of protecting the groundwater basins over which they
lie and the groundwater resources within their territory. The agencies generally
are empowered to adopt groundwater management plans when they determine
that "groundwater management activities are necessary in order to improve or
protect the quantity or quality of groundwater supplies within a groundwater
basin or aquifer."'74 As part of a groundwater management plan, agencies can

171.

There are ten special Groundwater Management Districts established under California

law. Stv CAL WATER CODE APP. § 118-1 To 118-801 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (Monterey Peninsula
Water Management District), id. §§ 119-101 to 119-1201 (Sierra Valley Groundwater Management
District), id. §§ 119-1301 (Long Valley Groundwater Management District), id. §§ 121-102 to 121 -1101
(Fox Cannon Groundwater Management Agency), id. §§ 124-101 to 124-1101 (Pajaro Valley Water
Management Agency), id. §§ 128-1 to 128-901 (Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management
District), id. §§ 129-101 to 129-1201 (Honey Lake Valley Groundwater District), id.§§ 131-101 to 1311201 (Ojain Groundwater management Agency), id. §§ 10700 (Mendocino Community Service
District). In 1995, the legislature also authorized the formation of the Surprise Valley Groundwater
Management District. See id. §§ 137-101 to 137-1301. The voters of the district, however, have not yet
approved the formation of such a district.
Two special act water districts, the Orange County Water District, see id §§ 40-1 to 40-78, and
the Santa Clara Valley Water District, id §§ 60-1 to 69-35, have been granted groundwaer
management powers. These districts can levy a "basin equity assessment" or pump taxes to
regulate groundwater extractions, but they do not possess the authority to regulate groundwater
extractions by ordinance. See, e.g. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 40-31.5; Weber, supra note 9, at 735.
172.

CAL. WATER CODE APP.

121-102 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).

173.

Id.

174.

See, e.g., id. § 119-501 (authorizing Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District to

conduct hydrological investigation and study of the basin over which the district lies), id.§ 121-501
(Fox Canyon Water District), id. § 124-701 (Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency). The
legislature has specifically instructed certain groundwater management agencies to conduct
comprehensive studies of the hydrologic conditions of the basin over which they lie. Section 131603 of the California Water Code provides, for example, that:
the [Ojai Groundwater Management] Agency shall undertake a groundwater
management study for future extractions from the basin. As a part of this study,
the agency shall determine the hydrologic characteristics of the basin, which
shall include all of the following information:
(1)

Existing groundwater storage capacity;

(2)

Existing groundwater storage;
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exercise some or all of the following powers: (1) store and recapture water in
groundwater basins and surface reservoirs within their district; (2) require users
within their jurisdiction to utilize conservation measures and practices;' (3)
'control groundwater extractions by regulating, limiting or suspending
extractions from extraction facilities, the construction of new extraction
facilities, the enlarging of existing facilities and the reactivation of abandoned
extraction facilities;''

76

(4) regulate replenishment programs;'

7

1

(5) determine the

amount of groundwater space available within the groundwater basin and
allocate the available storage space; 17 and (6) "commence and prosecute
actions to enjoin unreasonable uses or methods of use of groundwater within
the district or outside of the district to the extent79 those uses or methods of use
affect the groundwater supply within the district.

The enabling legislation for some of the groundwater management
districts grants the agency the power to control the places where the water can
be dedicated to use and provide a legislative prioritization of appropriative
groundwater rights. Five groundwater management agencies have been granted

(3)

Existing and projected groundwater use;

(4)

A review of the boundaries of the basin;

(5)

The average annual variation in storage in existing groundwater storage;

(6)

Projected annual rainfall, runoff, and recharge rates;

(7)

Long-term recoverable storage, including an estimate of nonrecoverable
storage; and

(8) Potential extractions and storage programs.
Id. § 131-603.
175.

See id. § 119-702(d) (Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District and Long

Valley Groundwater Management District), id. § 121-701(a) (Fox Canyon Groundwater
Management Agency), id. § 131-702(a) (Ojai Groundwater Management Agency), id. § 129702(b) (Honey Lake Valley Groundwater Management District).
176.

Id. § 121-701(b) (Fox Canyon); id. § 119-702(g) (Sierra Valley and Long Valley
Groundwater Management Agencies), id. § 129-702(c) .(authorizing the Honey Lake
Groundwater Management District to limit extractions "in order to improve and protect the
quality of groundwater supplies or to respond to, and rectify, conditions of subsidence"), id.
§ 137-702(g) (Surprise Valley Groundwater Basin Act).
177.

See, e.g.,id.§ 129-702(d), 119-702(h), 124-703, 131-703.

178. See, e.g., id. §§ 124-703, 119-702(h), 137-702(h). Two groundwater management acts, the
Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act and the Pajaro Valley Water Management Agency Act, provide
that "itihe district, or other persons pursuant to an agreement with the district, shall have the sole
right to store and recapture water in the groundwater basin." Id.§ 119-702(i); see also id. 124-704.
179.

Id. § 129-702(e); see also id. §§ 118-328(e), 121-701(c), 124-705, 131-702(b).
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authority to restrict the exportation of their groundwater supplies.'80 The
enabling acts for these districts prohibit the exportation'.. of water from the
district without a permit from the controlling agency. The statutes then provide
that a permit may be issued only if the applicant demonstrates that there is
surplus water available, and the district determines that exportation of district
water will not adversely affect the rights of groundwater users within the
district.'82 The district is instructed to limit or to suspend exports whenever it
determines that such limitation is needed to protect the groundwater basin. 83
The legislation that created the Sierra Valley Groundwater Management District
and the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District also sets
forth priorities of rights to the district's groundwater. Both overlying users and
appropriators who use water within the boundaries of the district, but not on
land overlying the basin, 84 are given priority over appropriators who use the
water outside the district. Because the priority is granted "irrespective of the
time the export uses are commended,"" 5 this provision can result in the
reordering of existing uses.'8 6 Parties who use water on land overlying the basin
have superior rights under state groundwater law, but the acts authorize the
districts to assign equal priority to some district off-basin users, if the district
finds that the off-basin use "is necessary for the equitable distribution of the
' 7
groundwater resource. ,18

Most groundwater management districts also have the power to define
and quantify rights to groundwater within their district in times of shortage.
When a district determines that it is necessary to limit or suspend extraction to
prevent overdraft, it has the authority to quantify each user's right and to
apportion the available supply. Generally, the available water supply is divided

180. The districts that possess export authority include: the Sierra Valley
Groundwater Management District, the Long Valley Groundwater Management District, the
Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District, the Honey Lake Valley
Groundwater Management District, and the Ojai Basin Groundwater Management District.
181. The statutes generally define export to mean "groundwater extracted for use
outside the boundaries of the district." Id. §§119-307, 128-307, 129-307, 131-309.
182.

See id.

183.

See id.§§119-706, 119-707, 128-706(b), 128-707.

184. The statutes call these users "district off-basin users." Id.§§ 119-306, 128-306
("District off-basin user" means a person extracting groundwater for use on land within the
district that does not overlie the groundwater basin).
185.

Id.§§ 119-709.7, 128-710.

186. Because both exporters and district off-basin users are exercising appropriative
rights, under the common law system, the use which was commenced first would have
absolute priority over the later. Weber, supra note 9,at 738.
187. CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 119-709.7, 128-710 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
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among district users based on either the historic amount of water used' for the
percentage of overlying land each groundwater producer owns or leases.'89 The
agency may adjust the figure, however, if it determines that such division will
not result in the equitable distribution of water throughout the entire district. 90
Groundwater management districts also may regulate groundwater use by
requiring well registration and extraction statements, by determining well
spacing, and by prohibiting well interference. 9' Groundwater management
districts can fund their management
activities through groundwater extraction
92
and management charges.

b.

General Act Districts

The legislature has authorized the formation of various water districts of limited
statutory powers to conduct certain groundwater management activities.'93 None of
the general act districts have the authority to directly regulate or to limit groundwater
extractions or to define groundwater rights. Many of these water districts can indirectly
manage groundwater use, however, through their authority to levy assessment fees on
the production of groundwater ("pump taxes") and to manage replenishment
programs."' General act districts also have the authority to initiate or participate in

188.

See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE APP. § 124-712 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) ("available supply

of groundwater shall be allocated primarily on the basis of the amount of water used by the
operator as a percentage of the total amount of the water being used within the agency").
189.

See, e.g., id. § 128-709 ("rights to the use of the available supply of groundwater

shall be allocated primarily on the basis of the number of acres overlying the basin or
subbasin that a user owns or leases in proportion to the total number of acres overlying the
basin or subbasin").
190.

In making this determination, the agencies must consider the following factors: "(a) The

number of acres actually irrigated compared to the number of acres owned or leased. (b) Crop type.
(c) Wasteful or inefficient use. (d) Reasonable need. (e)Water conservation activities. (f) Any other
factors that the board reasonably determines it should consider in order to reach an equitable
distribution within the entire district." ld. § 128-709; see aso i. § 119-709.5
191.

See, e.g.,id.§§ 119-601 to 119-605, 119-703, and 119-704.

192.

See, e.g., id. §§ 129-801 to 129-807, and 129-901 to 129-905.

193.

See CAL. WATER CODE § 20500 (Irrigation Districts), id. § 3000 (County Water

Districts), id. § 34000 (Water Districts), id. § 39000 (Water Storage Districts), id. § 50000
(Reclamation Districts), id. § 55000 (County Waterworks Districts), id. § 56000 (Drainage
Districts), id. § 60000 (Water Replenishment Districts), id. § 70000 (Levee Districts), id.
71000 (Municipal Water Districts), id. § 74000 (Water Conservation Districts).
194.

See Neese, supra note 69, at 50.
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litigation that affects the common supply of users within the districts and to take other
actions to protect the quality of groundwater.'95
c.

Area of Origin Statute Limitations: Water Code
Section 1220

"In 1984, the Legislature enacted sweeping "area of origin" protection for
over a dozen identified Northern California stream systems."'9 6 This legislation
included section 1220 of the Water Code. Section 1220 prohibits the pumping of
the groundwater "for export within the combined Sacramento and Delta-Central
Sierra Basins ...unless the pumping is in compliance with a groundwater
management plan that is adopted by Icounty] ordinance ..."" Pursuant to this
section, the board of supervisors of a county that includes any part of the
combined Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basin is authorized to adopt
groundwater management plans "to implement the purposes of this section."'98
The legislation does not require the county board of supervisors to enact such
management plans, however, nor does it specify the components that such a
plan should include.'
d.
In

AB 3030 Groundwater Management Plans

1992, -the legislature passed the Groundwater Management Act,

commonly referred to as AB 3030, which added sections 10750 through 10755.4
to the Water Code."' The purpose of the legislation was to clarify the authority
of local water agencies (including cities and counties) to manage and regulate
the use of groundwater. The law applies to all groundwater basins in the state,
except for those that have been adjudicated. 0 ' Adoption of a local groundwater
management plan pursuant to AB 3030 is optional. Local water agencies may

195. See, e.g., CAL.WATER CODE § 60222 (authorizing a water replenishment district to take
any action necessary to prevent "interference with water, the quality thereof, or water rights of
persons or property within the district"), id.§§ 74641-74643 (enabling Water Conservation Districts
to bring or to participate in litigation involving the use or ownership of water rights within the
district and in actions to prevent interference with water within the district).
196.

Weber, supra note 9, at 689 (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1215-1220).

197.
198.

CAL. WATERCODE§ 1120

(a) (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

Id.§ 1220(b).

199.

See Weber, supra note 9, at 688.

200.

CAL. WATER CODE §§

201.

See id. § 10750.2. The local agency or watermaster with jurisdiction over an

10750-10755.4 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).

adjudicated basin may consent, however, to regulation under AB 3030. See id.
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not regulate groundwater under AB 3030, however, within the20service
area of
2
another local agency without the agreement of the other agency.
The formulation and adoption of local groundwater plans must be
conducted in accordance with the notice, comment and public hearing
requirements of section 6066 of the Government Code." 3 Landowners within the
jurisdiction of the agency may file written protests to the plan." 4 If a majority of
the landowners objects to the plan, the agency must withdraw it and may not
consider the adoption of a new or revised plan for a period of one year."'
According to the legislature, a local groundwater management plan may
include the following components:
(a)The control of saline water intrusion;
(b)Identification and management of wellhead protection areas and recharge
areas;
(c) Regulation of the migration of contaminated groundwater;
(d)The administration of a well abandonment and well destruction.program;
(e) Mitigation of conditions of overdraft;
(f) Replenishment of groundwater extracted by water producers;
(g) Monitoring of groundwater levels and storage;
(h)Facilitating conjunctive use operations;
(i) Identification of well construction policies;
(j) The construction and operation by the local agency of groundwater
contamination cleanup, recharge, storage, conservation, water
recycling, and extraction projects;
(k)The development of relationships with state and federal regulatory
agencies; and
(1)The review of land use plans and coordination with land use planning
agencies to assess activities which create a reasonable risk of
groundwater contamination.2"
AB 3030 authorizes the local agency to adopt rules and regulations to
implement the plan.2"7 These rules and regulations do not constitute, however, a

202. See id. § 10750.7. There is a slightly different rule with respect to groundwater
basins that are critically overdrafted as defined by DWR. See id.§ 10750.8.
203.

See id.§§ 10753.2-10753.6.

204.

See id.§§ 10753.5, 10753.6.

205. See id. § 10753.6(c). The Act defines "majority" as protesting landowners who
represent more than fifty percent of the assessed value of the land within the agency that is
subject to the proposed groundwater management plan.
206.

CAL. WATERCODE§

207.

See id.§ 10753.8(a).

10753.7.
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'
"binding determination of the water rights of any person or entity." The Act also
stipulates that the local agency may not limit or suspend groundwater pumping
unless it has determined "through study and investigation that groundwater
replenishment programs or other altemative sources of water supply have proved
9
insufficient or infeasible to lessen the demand for groundwater." Finally, in
adopting rules and regulations to implement the plan, the local agency must
consider the potential impact of its actions on business and agriculture and, "to the
extent practicable and consistent with the protection of the groundwater-resources,
minimize any adverse impacts on those business activities."2 0
The Act grants local agencies the power to take all actions necessary to
replenish groundwater and to manage the aquifer to achieve sustainable
yield. 2 ' This authority includes the establishment and collection of fees and
assessments to pay for these programs and to regulate the extraction and use of
groundwater.2 2 Before it may adopt a fee or assessment program, however, the
agency must conduct an election. A majority vote of the "votes cast" is required
for approval of fees or assessments.2"3
Finally, the legislature stated its intent "to encourage local agencies,
within the same groundwater basin ....to adopt and implement a coordinated
groundwater management plan."2 4 To accomplish this, the Act authorizes local
agencies to enter into joint powers agreements or other agreements with public
entities and private parties. 2 5
One of the difficulties in implementing AB 3030, of course, is coordination
among local water agencies, private property owners, businesses, cities,
counties and other public agencies (such as sewage treatment plant operators)
that overlie, or whose actions affect, the groundwater basin. There is little
information available on this subject.

208.

Id.§ 10753.8(b).

209.
210.

Id.§ 10753.8(c).
Id.§ 10753.9.

211.

Seeid.§10754.

212.

Seeid. § 10754, 10754.2.

213. Se id.§ 10754.3. The wording of this section suggests that the majority of "votes cast'to
approve the adoption of a fee or assessment program is a majority of the voters, not a majority of the
landowners representing more than fifty percent of the assessed value of the land within the agency.
Thus, the voting requirement for approval of fees and assessments is different from the majority vote
groundwater management plan.
required to veto the agency's adoption of the local
214.
215.

Id.§ 10755.2(a).
See id. § 10755.2(b), (c).
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e.

City and County Groundwater Management Powers

The California Supreme Court has held that regulation of groundwater is
within municipal police power.2 6 Thus, a city or county may enact laws to
manage groundwater in an effort to promote the health, safety, and welfare of
its citizens.2 7 Local governments may not pass laws, however, that duplicate,
contradict or enter into an area of law occupied by general state law.2'8 State law
occupies a field when its coverage of a subject matter clearly indicates that the
matter is exclusively within the state's jurisdiction.2 9
Over the past few decades, several counties have exercised their police
power to regulate the extraction and use of groundwater 2 These ordinances
prohibit the export of groundwater without a permit. In general, the county will
only issue a permit if the applicant demonstrates that the exportation of the
water will not injure county water users or damage the groundwater basin.22'
Recently, the Third District court of appeal, in the case of Baldwin v. Tehama,
held that state law, while regulating aspects of groundwater, does not preempt
county regulation.222 In Tehama, local landowners brought a facial challenge to a
county ordinance claiming that state law preempted the county's authority to enact
groundwater regulation.223 The Tehama county ordinance prohibited the "mining" of
groundwater within the county and the extraction of groundwater for export without
a permit granted by the board of supervisors. A permit would be issued only if the
board found that the proposed use of groundwater would not result in overdraft,
saltwater intrusion, adverse effects on stream flows, lowering of the water table or
mining of the groundwater basin. The ordinance further prohibited the operation of

216.

See In re Mass, 219 Cal. 422, 424-25 (1933).

217.

See id.; Ex Parte Elam, 6 Cal. App. 233 (1907).

218.

See id.

219.

See Fisherv. Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d 644, 708 (1984).

220. See Imperial County, Cal., Ordinance 420 (July 18, 1972), 432 (Nov. 21, 1972);
Butte County, Cal., Ordinance 1859 (Aug. 23, 1977); Glenn County, Cal., Ordinance 672
(Sept. 6, 1977); Modoc County, Cal., Ordinance 255 (Mar. 6, 1978); Sacramento County, Cal.,
Ordinance 410, § 2 (1980); Inyo County, Cal., Referendum Measure A (passed Nov. 4, 1980);
Nevada County Cal., Ordinance 1365 (Jan. 27, 1986); 1370 (Mar. 24, 1986); Tehama County,
Cal, Ordinance 1552 (Feb. 4, 1992), 1553 (Feb. 18, 1992).
221. For a survey of the county ordinances, see Weber, supra note 9; see also Gregory S.
Weber, Forging a More Coherent Groundwater Policy in California: State and Federal Constitutional Law
Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34 SArrARCA L. REV. 273 (1994) (discussing
local government's constitutional authority to restrict groundwater exports).
222.

31 Cal. App. 4th 166, 171 (1994).

223.

Seeid. at 172.
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a well in a manner that would result, in the radiance of influence of the well
transgressing the property lines of the parcel on which the well was located.224
The court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision that the county ordinance
was preempted by state law. 2" The court conduded that, because there was no
comprehensive state-wide regulatory scheme for managing groundwater rights, the
county could regulate groundwater uses. Although the Court did not rule on the
constitutionality of the various prohibitions of the ordinance, it did indicate that an
ordinance that barred present use of water simply to protect a future use within the
area of origin might conflict with the dictates of Article X, Section 2.22
The Tehama decision allows cities and counties more aggressively to manage
their groundwater resources. Direct regulation of groundwater can avoid the need for
lengthy and costly adjudications. Moreover, direct regulation requires no special
election, but simply the passage of an ordinance. These types of ordinances are not
generally subject to the veto provisions that limit AB 3030 water plans.
IV.

Legal Uncertainties Inherent In the Current Regime for Regulating
Groundwater

Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, as well as the concomitant
movement of water between in-basin and off-basin sites, inevitably gives rise to a
number of complex legal questions. Prominent legal issues include: the rights of
users to interconnected surface and groundwater; the priority of rights to storage
space within an aquifer; agency authority to manage water imported and stored in a
groundwater basin; protection of water quality; and regulation of exported water.
A.

Uncertainties Regarding Rights to Interconnected Surface
and Groundwater

As previously noted, many groundwater basins are hydrologically
connected to surface water systems. If such a basin is used as a storage site for a
conjunctive use project, conflicts may develop between parties who hold rights
to the surface waterand those who hold rights either to the native groundwater
or the imported "project" water. For example, if the extraction of project water
during times of scarcity causes the groundwater table to drop to the extent that
surface water percolates into the basin, parties with rights to the surface water
may claim a right to prohibit the agency administering the conjunctive use
program from exporting project water from the basin. The resolution of such a
conflict would be highly fact specific, and the outcome is uncertain.

224.

Seeid. at 171-72.

225.

Seeid.at 182.

226.

See id.
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B.

Lack of Priorities to Storage Space

Public agencies have a right to place water in natural groundwater basins as
part of a conjunctive use project.22 There exists no statewide system, however, for
allocating storage space within basins or for prioritizing the rights of the various
entities who participate in, or who may be affected by, such projects. For example,
it is an open question whether an overlying landowner or agency that wishes to
use all of the available storage space in an aquifer has the right to enjoin an offbasin entity from storing water in the basin.22 Similarly, it is unclear whether an
agency with an established conjunctive use program could prevent another entity
from storing water in the same basin when the former intends eventually to use all
of the available storage space as part of its program.
If more than one water agency uses a particular basin to store water, conflicts
over the right to extract the water stored in the basin also may develop. For example,
groundwater recharge can cause a basin to fill and thereby prevent natural recharge
from percolating into the basin. In such a situation, the amount of native
groundwater stored within the basin will be diminished and the loss of that natural
recharge must be allocated. If only one agency has water stored in the basin, and is
therefore responsible for the artificial filling of the basin, that agency should be
liable for the loss of native groundwater supply.229 If more than one entity stores
imported water in a basin, however, the law does not adequately define how liability
for the loss of natural recharge would be allocated.23
C.

Protection of the Quantity of Project Water Stored in a
Groundwater Basin

For a conjunctive use project to function, the supplier of the imported
project water must have legal assurances that it will have a superior right to the

227. See generally City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199 (1975);
Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
228. In Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the California Supreme Court did not address the
issue of prioritization of groundwater basin storage space, because it found that there was
not "any shortage of underground storage space in relation to the demand therefore." 14
Cal. 3d at 264. The legislature has provided, however, that the Sierra Valley Groundwater
Management District and the Pajaro Valley Water Agency shall have exclusive authority to
store water in the underlying groundwater. Moreover, other special acts districts are
authorized to allocate the available storage space within their groundwater basin. These
agencies, therefore, could enjoin others from storing water within their districts.
229.

See Victor E. Gleason, The Legalization of Ground Water Storage, 14 Am. WATER

RESOuRcES ASS'N, WATER REsouRcEs BULL. 532 (June 1978).

230.

See Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 55.
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water it stores in the basin. Although the courts have held that an importer 2of
3
water has an exclusive right to recapture water attributable to its deliveries, 1
the enforcement of such a right is complicated by the fact that groundwater
rights are generally not quantified under California law.
Because groundwater is a common resource, the extraction of water from
any point overlying the basin may affect the amount of water within the entire
basin. Thus, an importing agency must have the ability to monitor the water
levels within a basin to ensure that no one is wrongfully taking project water
from the basin. If the imported water is being extracted unlawfully, the drop in
groundwater levels would notify the supplier that its rights were being
invaded.232 A declining groundwater table would not inform the agency,
however, of the identity of the parties who were invading its water rights. To
identify the party or parties, the agency would need to monitor the amount of
water that each extraction facility overlying the basin was producing.
To accomplish this, the agency would have to have access to the pumping
records for each well that produces water from the basin.233 Currently, there is no
statewide requirement that groundwater users maintain a record of their
extractions; nor does any state agency collect and maintain such data.
Moreover, agencies only have the authority to require groundwater producers to
maintain extraction records if their enabling legislation specifically provides
such power.2 " Therefore, the agency would need to work with either a local
agency that had the authority to require recordkeeping (if one existed for the
basin), or the agency would have to enter into contracts with the overlying
landowners under which the overlying owners would agree to compile the
relevant information. Only with such information could the water importing
agency adequately supervise the amount of water taken from the basin.
D.

Protection of Water Quality

The quality of water stored within a groundwater basin will depend on the level
of contaminants present in the basin, as well as on the quality of water that recharges
the basin. If the quality of the water imported into the basin is of significantly lesser

231.

See City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 264; City of Los

Angeles v.City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d at 76-77.

232.

To ascertain whether the drop in the water table was attributable to an

extraction of the natural groundwater to which the supplier has no rights or to the extraction

of the imported water to which the importer has an exclusive right, the supplier also would
need to.monitor the amount of natural recharge that was reaching the basin.
233. The most accurate way to measure the amount of water that is being pumped
from a groundwater basin is to monitor individual pumping, which requires the licensing of
wells and the installation of meters. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 698 n.84.
234.

See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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quality than the native groundwater, a court would have the authority to enjoin the
importation and artificial recharge."5 Conversely, the quality of the imported water can
be diminished by its placement in an aquifer. Surface activities may threaten water
quality in the aquifer generally, and it is uncertain whether the importing agency would
have the legal authority to control land uses that may be polluting the aquifer.23
E.

Exportation of Project Water

In Los Angeles v. Glenda/e and Los Angeles v. San Fernando, the California Supreme
Court upheld Los Angeles' rights to recapture imported water that is stored in a
groundwater basin, or which is used on overlying land and which subsequently
percolates into the aquifer. Since that time, however, the legislature has enacted, or
authorized the enactment of, restrictions on the exportation of groundwater from
specified basins.237 The effect of these export limits on the operation of conjunctive use
programs is unclear. For example, no court has yet determined the effect of section
1220 of the Water Code on an agency's ability to pump foreign water that it imports
into a basin for subsequent use outside the basin. Section 1220 expressly prohibits the
pumping of groundwater for export from within the identified basins "unless the
pumping is in compliance with a groundwater management plan" adopted by the
county board of supervisors.238 If an agency stores water within one of the identified
basins, this section may preclude the agency from transporting the stored water for

235.

Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution would prohibit the placement of

highly contaminated water within a basin. It is uncertain, however, what level of disparity in water
quality must be present before a groundwater user could prevent an agency from discharging
poorer quality water into the basin. Taking into consideration the statewide need to maximize
developed water supplies, a court would be likely to find that some degradation of water quality is
acceptable given the benefits obtained through the conjunctive use program. See, e.g., Anderson,
supra note 17, at 574 (describing the SWRCB's decision to authorize the discharge of water of
poorer quality than the native supply in the Chino Basin based on its determination that the
value of the conjunctive use program outweighed the risk to water quality).
236.

See Linda A. Malone, The Necessary InterrelationshipBetween Land Use and Preservationof

Groundwater Resources, 9 UCLA I. ENVrL. L. & POLY 1 (1990).
237.

The legislature also may have authorized local agencies to limit the export of

groundwater as part of a local groundwater management plan enacted pursuant to AB 3030.
See Weber, supra note 9, at 696. Several cities and counties have also enacted export
regulations pursuant to their police power.
238.

It is noteworthy that the basins which are protected by section 1220 may be

particularly well-suited to serve as conjunctive use project sites because there already exists
in these areas a vast network of conveyance facilities and, thus, a conjunctive use program
would not require the large expenditures to construct adequate conveyance facilities.
Moreover, these basins have suffered extended periods of overdraft, and the storage of
project water within the basin could help to mitigate the adverse effects of such overdraft
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use outside the basin unless the export of the stored water is in compliance with the
designated groundwater management plan. The legislature may not have intended
this limitation to apply to the export of stored foreign water, because the water did not
originate within the protected watersheds.239 It did not expressly exempt imported
water from the coverage of section 1220, however.240
Ifsection 1220 does apply to the export of stored water, it is difficult to assess its
effects on the operation of conjunctive use projects. The statute requires groundwater
exports to be "in compliance with" an adopted groundwater management plan.2 11 This
could be interpreted as prohibiting all pumping for export until a county enacts a
groundwater management plan with which the export pumping would need to
comply. Altematively, the section can be read as only prohibiting exports that
contravene an enacted groundwater management plan; and, if no such plan exists,
there are no restrictions on groundwater exports.242 Under the former interpretation, a
county could prevent its groundwater basins from being used as part of a conjunctive
use project simply by not acting. Under the latter construction, a county would have to
enact a groundwater management plan to prevent an agency from utilizing available
storage space in its basin.243
Similar questions arise in those basins that are govemed by local groundwater
management plans adopted under AB 3030, or pursuant to city or county ordinance.
Generally, these plans prohibit the export of groundwater without a permit and

239. Section 1220 is part of a larger area-of-origin statute that the legislature enacted
to ensure that the appropriation of water from the designated area to meet the supply
needs of other regions does not deprive users within the designated areas of water from
meeting their needs. See 1984 Cal. Stat. § 1.

240. The legislature did create two exceptions to section 1220. First, the statute does not
apply to exports by either the United States Bureau of Reclamation or the California Department
of Water Resources. CAL. WATER CODE § 1215 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993). Second, "water that has
seeped into the underground from any reservoir, afterbay, or other facility of an export project
may be returned to the water supply of the export project." Id. § 1220. Whether the latter
exemption could be construed to exempt project water that is directly discharged into a
groundwater basin governed by section 1220 for subsequent export is an open question.
241.

Id.§ 1220(a).

242.

See Weber, supra note 9, at 696.

243. Determination of the potential effect of section 1220 groundwater management
plans on the ability of agencies to engage in conjunctive management programs within the
"protected area" is further complicated by the fact that the county board of supervisors is not
permitted to "exercise the powers authorized by this section within the boundaries of another
local agency supplying water to that area without the prior agreement of the governing body of
that other local agency." CAL. WATER CODE § 1220(c) (West 1992 &Supp. 1993). Thus, if section
1220. is read to require a county board of supervisors to enact a groundwater management
plan before a conjunctive use project could legally be operable, any local water supply agency
that delivered water within the county would have the power to veto the creation of the project.
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provide that a permit will only be granted if the governing agency determines that the
exports will not adversely affect in-basin users.244 It is unclear whether local
governments have the authority under AB 3030, or pursuant to their police powers, to
limit an importing agency's property rights to water stored within a basin.
V.

Feasibility of Establishing Conjunctive Use Programs Under Current Law

"Legal uncertainties regarding groundwater storage rights have been
raised continually as a serious obstacle to developing a comprehensive program
of groundwater storage and management.24' These obstacles can be overcome,
however, by the creation of institutional arrangements that address the
problems analyzed above. The specific design of these arrangements will
depend on the types of water rights, laws and water management issues that are
present in the basin chosen for the conjunctive use project.
A.

Adjudicated Basins

Creation of a conjunctive use program is easiest in an adjudicated
groundwater basin.24 In an adjudicated basin, the rights to the native water
supply are defined by a court order. The pumping rights are quantified and a
court-appointed watermaster, who manages the basin, usually maintains
complete extraction records for each well that produces water from the basin.
The importing agency, therefore, would not be required to monitor extractions
to ensure that its stored supply is protected.247 Moreover, as part of the
adjudication itself, the hydrological and geological characteristics of the basin
are studied and factual disputes are resolved. Based on these data, the
importing agency could determine, to a large degree of certainty, the basin's
physical capacity to receive and retain project water without having to invest in
extensive scientific studies. The data also would help to avoid factual disputes if
conflicts over the basin's water supply develop at a later date. In such a basin,
the outcomes of future disputes would be most predictable, and the importing

244. For a survey of the substantive provisions of various county export ordinances,
see Weber, supra note 9, at 698-735.
245.

Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 51.

246. Indeed, some observers have considered adjudication to be an essential
prerequisite to groundwater banking. See, e.g., James H. Krieger & Harvey 0. Banks, Ground
Water Basin Management, 50 CAL.L. REv. 56, 61 (1962).
247. The importing agency's assurance that individual overlying landowners will not
invade its rights to stored water is somewhat diminished by the fact that the court does not
have authority to determine such users' unexercised rights. See Wright v. Goleta Water Dist.,
174 Cal. App. 3d 74 (1985).

West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008

agency would have relative certainty in its continued right to the use of the
stored water supply.
In addition, the legislature has prohibited local agencies from adopting
AB 3030 groundwater management plans for basins that are subject to court
orders, judgments or decrees.248 Therefore, a conjunctive use program
maintained in an adjudicated basin would not run the risk of being subjected to
multiple, potentially conflicting groundwater management plans.
B.

Special Act Districts

Special groundwater management districts possess a variety of
management powers that would assist the creation of conjunctive use projects.
First, special districts are authorized to store and recapture water within the
basins under their jurisdiction. Second, the legislature has endowed several
special districts with the power to allocate available storage space within their
basins. Thus, an importing agency could enter into a contract with the special
district to guarantee the right to use a specified amount of storage within the
aquifer and to operate a conjunctive use project for a specific amount of time.
Third, the special district's power to require groundwater producers to maintain
extraction records could provide the importing agency with assurances that no
one would interfere with its right to the stored water. Finally, special districts are
authorized to limit extractions if they determine that such action is necessary to
protect a groundwater basin. If the district exercises this authority, it can quantify
groundwater users' rights and thereby define rights to the native supply.

C.

General Act Districts

Although general act districts do not possess the power to directly manage
groundwater extraction, they nonetheless can exert considerable management
authority over underlying groundwater basins. For example, districts that supply
water to their members often hold title to the water rights or water contract rights of
their members. An importing agency could minimize the risks inherent in
implementing a conjunctive use program by contracting with the district to establish
methods for determining the amount of water that the district's members may
extract from the basin. If the district violated the agreement, the importing agency
could sue to enforce the contract without the need to bring all groundwater users
into the litigation. Because many general districts also have the authority to
maintain groundwater replenishment programs, the district and the importing
agency allocate between themselves the available storage within the basin.

248.
1148

See CAL WATER CODE § 10753 (West 1992 &Supp. 1993).
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D.

Basins Subject to AB 3030 Management Plans

AB 3030 expressly authorizes local agencies to include in their groundwater
249
management plans procedures for facilitating conjunctive use operations. The plan
50
management
also can provide for the monitoring of groundwater levels and storage
of recharge areas"' and procedures for reviewing land use activities that "create a
reasonable risk of groundwater contamination. 2" 2 Thus, local agencies that desire to
participate in conjunctive use programs could use the authority granted in AB 3030 to
clarify the rules applicable to such programs.
E.

Basins Subject to Multiple Agency Control

Because the physical boundaries of Califomia's groundwater basins often do not
align with the political boundaries of local water agencies and municipalities, there may
be a multitude of public entities that possess some management authority over a single
groundwater basin. The interplay of the various entities' management plans and
authorities can greatly complicate the process of establishing a conjunctive use program,
as well as increase the transaction costs of implementing such a program.
F.

Basins with Export Restrictions

As discussed previously, an importing agency that wants to store water in
a basin that is subject to export restrictions risks losing the right to extract water
for use outside the basin. Because the law does not clearly address the rights of
importing agencies subsequent to exporting project water, this risk may prevent
the implementation of a conjunctive use program in any basin subject to export
restrictions.
VI.

Suggestions for Legal Reform

As the legislature has
maintenance of conjunctive use
agencies and water users will
adequate legal assurances that

recognized, the design, implementation and
projects will require substantial investments. Water
participate in such programs only if there exist
they will benefit from participation and that their

property rights will not be impaired." 3 Under the current legal regime for regulating
Califomia's water resources, however, there are significant impediments to the
creation of conjunctive use projects. While parties can overcome many of these

249.

See id.§ 10753.7(i).

250..

See id.§ 10753.7(g).

251.

See id.§,10753.7(b).

252.

See id.
§ 10753.7(l).

253.

See, e.g., id§ 1011.5.
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impediments by contracting with agencies endowed with some groundwater
management authority, the legal uncertainties unnecessarily increase the cost of
implementing such programs and may discourage the creation of innovative
techniques for managing water resources."'
To address these problems, the legislature should amend the Water Code to
eliminate the unnecessary risks associated with participation in conjunctive use
programs and assign the risks that cannot be eliminated. This new legislation should
include express authorization for local entities with groundwater management
authority to engage in conjunctive use programs, and clarification of the ambit of the
various agencies' control over the water stored and used in such programs. Rights to
water stored in a groundwater basin pursuant to a conjunctive use project are most
secure where a local water management agency has the authority to define rights to
the native supply, define and prioritize rights to available storage space, protect
recharge areas and monitor extractions.
Delegation of this authority to local agencies is preferable to creation of a
state groundwater management law or agency. Because California encompasses
a large and hydrologically diverse area, the distinct problems of the different
areas require specialized attention. Moreover, it is unlikely that the legislature
would enact broad-scale legislation that alters the way in which the state's
groundwater resources are managed."
A.

Amend AB 3030

AB 3030 has provided local water agencies with many of the tools needed
to create and to administer conjunctive use programs. The legislature could
encourage the development of conjunctive use projects by strengthening this
law in three ways. First, it should amend Water Code section 107540.4 to require
local agencies with regulatory control over groundwater basins to adopt
groundwater management plans." 6 By directing local agencies to develop
groundwater management plans, the legislature would encourage the agencies

254. See, e.g., Zachary Smith, Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and
Prerequisitesto Reform, 20 CALW. L. REv. 223 (1984).
255. There have been many calls for the creation of a centralized state agency to
manage Califomia's groundwater resources. These proposals have been met with strong
opposition. For a discussion of the various legislative attempts to increase state control over
groundwater, see Kletzing, supra note 26, at 1254-57; Robie & Donovan, supra note 25, at 51;
and Krieger & Banks, supra note 246, at 67-68. See also CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. ON WATER,
GROUNDWATER PROBLEMS INCALIFORNIA 47-48 (Assembly Comm. Reps., Vol 26, No. 4, 1962);
GovERNOR'S COMM. To REvIEw CAL. WATER RIGHTS LAW, RNAL REPORT 168 (1978).

256. Section 10750.4 currently provides: "Nothing in this part requires a local agency
overlying a groundwater basin to adopt or implement a groundwater management plan or
groundwater management program pursuant to this part." CAL. WATER CODE § 10750.4 (West
1992 &Supp. 1993).
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to develop a better understanding of the hydrology of the basin, water rights,
water quality, supply and demand, and other information that is essential to
conjunctive water management.
Second, AB 3030 should also be amended to clarify the extent of local
agencies' legal authority to enter into conjunctive management agreements.
Section 10753.7 of the Water Code provides that an agency may include in its
groundwater management plan components designed to facilitate "conjunctive
use operations. '2 7 This section does not define the type of actions an agency
may take to carry out such a program, however. For example, it is unclear
whether a local agency may establish priorities to the use of available storage
space in the basin. 258It is also unclear whether local agencies may compel their
members to participate in a conjunctive use program. The legislature should
amend AB 3030 expressly to provide for this authority.
Third, to ensure that local agencies consider and evaluate competing
views and needs when designing their management plans, the legislature
should provide specific criteria that an agency must consider when establishing
rules and regulations to carry out the local groundwater management plans and
conjunctive use programs. These criteria should require the local agency to
consider not simply the needs of its users and region, but also the demand for
water in other parts of the state that might benefit from conjunctive
management of the groundwater basin over which the agency has jurisdiction.
The Water Code currently requires the agency only to consider the effects of its
AB 3030 plan "on business activities, including agricultural operations, and to
the extent practicable and consistent with the protection of the groundwater
resources, minimize adverse impacts on those business activities."'259 By
directing local agencies to take into account broader state interests when
designing and implementing groundwater management plans, the legislature
could help prevent the "Balkanization" of California's water resources policy.
B.

Enact Water Export Legislation

The existence of local groundwater plans or ordinances that prevent, or
severely limit, the export of groundwater from specified basins may cripple
efforts to create conjunctive use programs. The legislature should clarify the
authority of local agencies to enact and enforce anti-export ordinances. These
ordinances should not necessarily be prohibited. Although anti-export laws may
frustrate the development of conjunctive use projects, they also provide

257.

Id.§ 10753.7.

258. Section 10753.8 does state that "Inlothing in this part shall be construed as
authorizing the local agency to make a binding determination of the water rights of any
person or entity." Id. § 10753.8(b). This does not preclude the agency from establishing

priorities to the use of storage space, however.
259. Id.§ 10753.9.
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certainty to the supplier of imported water. Where an anti-export ordinance is in
place, an agency that imports and stores water in the basin will have assurances
that no third parties will extract the stored water for export outside the basin.
The legislature should declare that local groundwater laws which prohibit or
restrict the export of native groundwater may not be applied to imported water
stored in the basin for subsequent use or export. The legislation also should
provide that the importing agency and other parties to the conjunctive use
agreement shall retain the rights to use or to export the project water. Finally,
the legislature should provide that local agencies may not prevent the
implementation of a conjunctive use program simply by failing to enact a local
groundwater plan or other groundwater management ordinance.
VII. Conclusion
To ensure that California is able to meet its water needs in the twenty-first
century, new ways of managing available resources must be created. One of the
most promising techniques for stretching developed water resources is the
establishment of conjunctive use programs. Although there remain a variety of
institutional constraints imposed by California's multi-layered and complex
system of allocating its water resources that make it difficult to establish such
programs, it is possible under current law for water agencies to design and to
implement broad-scale conjunctive use programs by clarifying the participants'
rights and liabilities in contractual agreements.
To facilitate these arrangements, the California legislature should modify
the statutes that govern groundwater and local water agencies to help
accomplish more efficient conjunctive management of the state's water
resources. By clarifying the authority of local agencies to design, maintain and
enforce conjunctive use agreements, the legislature should remove barriers that.
presently create disincentives for participation in such programs.

